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This paper makes two points. The first is an empirical one, 
that the employees of a Japanese firm are very homogeneous; firms 
are observed to pull their employees from only one segment of the 
labor market. The second is a theoretical one, that the consider-
ation of factor market imperfections, such as the homogeneity 
discussed herein, is important for developing a more complete 
theory of the firm. Organization functions as a substitute for 
markets, and its form reflects their structure and faults. 
In this context, the important facet of homogeneity is that 
management is constrained from making distinctions in compensa-
tion among a firm's employees. This is obvious in large Japanese 
firms, with their enterprise unions; what this paper stresses is 
that homogeneity is a general feature of Japanese firms, large or 
small. The second contribution of this paper, motivated in part 
by this observation, is to introduce a new strand to the theory 
of the firm. Here it is claimed that identifiable factor market 
imperfections are important in determining the scope of the firm, 
and in particular serve as a force for dis-integration. In this 
it complements existing theories based on transaction costs and 
market power, which present reasons why firms should exist 
(activities be integrated).1 
In the manufacture of most products, a variety of labor 
inputs are required, e.g., skilled and unskilled. But homogeneity 
means that a firm is constrained from employing differing types 
of workers art different wages. Hence, for static efficiency, a 
firm will subcontract processes which require workers who are, in 
the labor market, paid less (or more) than its own employees. 
Elsewhere the author details the wide extent of such subcon-
tracting in Japanese manufacturing, particularly in the automo-
tive industry, though a brief overview is presented below. 
Instead, the bulk of this paper consists of a presentation of 
evidence for this homogeneity, from case studies drawn from the 
author's research in Japan, from standard statistical sources, 
and through a review of the secondary literature on Japanese 
labor relations. 
Similar imperfections in capital and other factor markets 
are not discussed herein; the author, in any event, believes that 
(at least in the Japanese case) labor market imperfections are 
the most important for understanding subcontracting. Again, the 
central concern of this paper is to demonstrate the homogeneity 
of labor in Japanese firms, and to present one implication of 
this for the theory of the firm. In keeping with this narrow 
focus, no systematic evidence is advanced concerning the extent 
to which homogeneity is a general feature of labor markets. 
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Several illustrations are provided, however, which suggest that 
the phenomena described herein are not uniquely "Japanese", but 
are also important in the US economy. 
Organization 
Following this introduction, Section II presents an overview 
of theories of the firm, highlighting the contribution of this 
research to that theory. A brief description of subcontracting in 
Japan is also included. Section III is the first of two on labor 
markets; it contrasts the range of (market) wages found in Japan 
with the relative homogeneity of the workforce in Japanese firms. 
Because of their aggregate nature, standard statistical sources 
are incapable of providing detail at the firm level; case studies 
are utilized as an essential, complementary data source. Section 
IV delves into the sources of this homogeneity, primarily through 
a review of the literature on labor relations in large Japanese 
firms. Section V raises several issues which are beyond the 
scope of this paper, including generalizations to the US labor 
market. Section VI briefly summarizes the paper. 
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II. Background and Theory of the Firm 
This section provides an overview of subcontracting in Japan 
in the automotive industry as background, and then surveys the 
theory of the firm. Following that, it argues that economic 
activity generates a demand for heterogeneous labor inputs. It 
then traces the implication of this in a firm-theoretic context 
when firms employ homogeneous labor. Subsequent sections 
demonstrate first the range of heterogeneity available in the 
Japanese labor market and second, that in comparison the labor 
employed within firms is homogeneous. 
Background: Subcontracting in Japan 
Manufacturing in Japan is organized in distinctly smaller 
units than in the U.S.; the decision to "buy" has been taken more 
frequently, relative to a US choice of "make". For example, the 
Japanese automobile manufacturers purchase 70% of the parts 
incorporated into their vehicles; GM purchases 40%. Furthermore, 
most of this difference stems from the purchase of parts which 
are unique to a specific model and require specialized assets for 
their production. 
One indication of this difference is to note that General 
Motors employs 440,000 in the U.S. alone (three quarters of a 
million world-wide); in manufacturing as a whole, only 15% of 
Americans are in establishments with under 50 employees. Firms in 
Japan, however, are in general smaller for a given volume of 
output. For example, Nissan and Toyota have between them 110,000 
employees -- 1/4 the size of the U.S. portion of GM -- while 
producing 25% more vehicles. (The inclusion of their 
subsidiaries roughly doubles their employment, which still leaves 
a two-fold difference in size.) GM may be somewhat less effi-
cient, but not by nearly a factor of 3 difference; clearly the 
Japanese firms "buy" relative to GMfs "make"*2 Similarly, in 
manufacturing as a whole, nearly half (46%) of the Japanese 
workers are found in establishments of less than 50 employees.3 
This is not a statistical artifact, due to a preponderance of 
small-firm dominated ("light") industry; most industries have 
more small-firm employment than in the US. 
Despite the greater utilization of purchased parts in the 
automotive industry, Toyota, Nissan and the other automotive 
firms each have only 200 to 300 "primary" suppliers from whom 
they purchase parts and components for use in assembly. Each rof 
these firms in turn has a network of suppliers. This "secondary" 
group of 2,000 or more (in general smaller) firms produces parts 
for incorporation into components by "primary" suppliers, or in 
some cases merely to be channeled by "primary" firms to the 
assemblers. "Secondary" suppliers are in turn supported by a 
tier of several thousand (and in general quite small) "tertiary" 
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subcontractors. In contrast, GM has 3500 direct suppliers of 
parts for assembly, and over twice that number when tooling, 
materials and non-production item suppliers are included. 
While not detailed in this paper, the author's research 
indicates that subcontracting was quantitatively and qualita-
tively different before 1950. Among other differences, "generic" 
processes ("drilling a hole") rather than "parts" were subcon-
tracted. Parts subcontracting began to develop rapidly with the 
Korean War boom, when production expanded during a period of labor 
unrest. Further expansion occurred from 1960, as modern assembly 
lines were introduced in a tightening labor market. There is thus 
an evolution of practices, with some correspondence of changes in 
subcontracting to changes in the labor market. 
The Japanese auto firms also use far fewer suppliers for 
each item, in the extreme only one per model-specific part, and 
two suppliers for that type of part across all model lines. The 
items they purchase are also on average more complex than in the 
US. The Japanese firms are much more likely to purchase subassem-
blies, such as entire seats; US automotive manufacturers instead 
purchase springs, material and so on and assemble seats them-
selves.4 Unlike the facilities needed to manufacture springs, 
those to make more specialized components and jigs and lines for 
carrying out assembly are highly model-specific. 
Such specificity gives rise to a bilateral monopoly between 
parts producer and vehicle assembler; the transactions cost 
literature suggests that the ensuing bargaining problems will 
lead to vertical integration of such firm-specific production. 
This has not occurred in Japan to the extent it has in the US, 
and this paper argues that one reason for this is the structure 
of of labor markets in Japan, which makes it relatively costly to 
organize the variety of operations required in manufacturing a 
vehicle within one firm.8 (Elsewhere innovations in contracting 
practices which serve to reduce contracting costs are discussed.) 
Theory of the Firm 
Why should this be so? And how is this relatively larger 
"market" in Japan organized? The latter question will be left 
for another occasion; herein the former is addressed, in the 
context of theories of vertical integration. Economic theory has 
offered several answers; most commonly, though, it has ignored 
the issues altogether, by positing perfect and frictionless mar-
kets where "firms" as we know them do not exist, or where they 
are a "black box" which, once the relevant comparative static 
responses are known, need not otherwise be examined. While 
clearly a fruitful approach for many issues, it fails to give any 
insight into why firms exist or assume a given size, or what 
their economic role is, relative to "markets". A second, and 
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again largely empty theory is that firms exist because of physi-
cal (technological) jointness: a continuous caster must of neces-
sity be in the same firm as the steel furnace; few equally com-
pelling examples can be found, and counterexamples abound.6 That 
firms exist because they must is not a very useful insight. 
Until recently, the largest strand of literature was related 
to antitrust. In this literature it is argued that when prices 
do not reflect opportunity costs, as occurs with monopoly, verti-
cal integration can enhance profits. Where the purchaser, for 
instance, faces a monopolistic market for an input into produc-
tion, one response is to integrate backwards, so that the firm 
can now base its production decisions on the basis of (internal) 
marginal costs rather than the (excessive) market cost. Unfortu-
nately the theory suggests no disadvantages to vertical integra-
tion; since market imperfections of one or another sort are 
pervasive, the same logic implies that the entire economy should 
be "organized". It does provide a theory of why firms may be 
preferred to markets, but at the cost of excluding markets. 
Government-instituted market distortions or other policies 
are another possible influence on firm boundaries. A firm may be 
granted a legal monopoly in the form of patents, and as argued 
above this provides a rational for vertical integration. In the 
case of patents, however, only if a merger can be arranged can a 
downstream user of the patented good do this, and in Japan mer-
gers for institutional reasons are relatively unusual, especially 
among large firms; Aoki [forthcoming], among others, discusses 
some of these factors. Automotive industry examples here might 
include power steering and braking systems -- and in both cases 
automotive firms managed eventually to lessen the monopolistic 
position of such suppliers through joint ventures.7 A second 
type of example comes from items in the tax code or other bar-
riers to interfirm transactions. Output taxes (sales taxes on 
interfirm sales as well as to consumers) are imposed in some 
developing countries, making it advantageous to organize opera-
tions in-house that would otherwise be kept independent. 
Similarly, the lack of reliable markets in centrally-planned 
economies leads to extensive vertical integration in the Soviet 
Union. One example in the Japanese case is that firms legally 
classified as "small and medium enterprises" enjoy certain tax 
advantages and access to small business financial institutions, 
although this advantage is small and seems to have been utilized 
primarily by closely-held firms.8 
The most useful approach to date has been to remove the 
assumption that economic activity can be organized without fric-
tion or cost. The transactions cost theory (Williamson [1985]) 
develops a theory of determinants of these costs, with "asset 
specificity" the primary datum used to distinguish those transac-
tions which are organized at less cost in markets from those more 
efficiently organized within firms. It does this by stressing 
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the opportunism and bounded rationality of agents, which make 
contracting ("markets") difficult when the assets involved are 
specific, relative to the governance mechanisms available inter-
nal to firms. In the words of Williamson ([1975], p. 124): 
Shifting a transaction from the market to the firm is 
significant not because a small-numbers exchange 
relationship is eliminated but rather because the 
incentives of the parties are transformed. 
This paper seeks not to deny the transactions cost approach. 
The uniqueness of many if not virtually all parts in an automo-
bile to a specific model suggests that transactions costs will be 
an important explanatory factor of vertical integration by auto-
motive firms, and this has been born out by research on the U.S. 
industry (Monteverde and Teece [1980, 1982]). In the case of 
Japan, the activities incorporated in the eleven domestic manu-
facturers are common to all auto manufacturers, no matter the 
nationality. The Japanese firms, like their rivals in the US 
and Europe design, coordinate marketing, carry out final 
assembly, make large stampings, and cast, machine and assem-
ble the engine; most firms also assemble and manufacture key 
components of the steering assembly and transmission / drive 
train. All of these are processes which are highly specific to 
automotive production; the author, for example, is familiar with 
no other industry which makes use of large stampings (such as 
fenders) or large, high volume castings (engine blocks).9 
The theoretical approach presented below complements these 
existing models. The claim here is that it is necessary to 
examine the structure of markets, not merely in terms of 
monopoly, but rather of institutional and other imperfections. In 
particular, here it is argued that the structure of labor markets 
in Japan, as detailed below, shifts at the margin the decisions 
of firms to subcontract or to vertically integrate. While this 
possibility have been referred to in the literature, it has 
been done as an afterthought10; such failures are implicitly 
treated as being either uninteresting or unimportant. To 
reiterate, the model presented here argues that they are in fact 
important. (In addition to labor markets, the dissertation 
chapter from which this paper is drawn will also discuss capital 
markets.)11 Next a model of the demand for heterogeneous labor 
is developed. The importance of homogeneous labor for the theory 
of the firm will then be apparent. 
Heterogeneity: Theory 
The production of an auto or other assembled product 
requires a tremendous range of materials, capital goods, 
manufacturing processes and design and management services. Not 
only the quantities, but also the qualities of labor required 
vary substantially, from (potentially) a "human" machine for 
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installing widgets in a mindless (but difficult to automate) 
fashion, to skilled engineers in design work. These dif-
ferences are qualitative, not merely quantitative: a worker 
"on the line" typically cannot carry out design work, while an 
engineer is capable of performing assembly work, and probably 
"with as much efficiency. -Thus, individual efficiency and human 
capital accumulation aside, labor inputs must be disaggregated, 
and economic logic (where wages in equilibrium correspond to the 
marginal product of labor) suggests there is no a_ priori reason 
to expect compensation for such dissimilar workers to be equal. 
In terms of observables, individuals in the labor market 
are commonly classified by various characteristics, such as 
age, education, prior experience, geographical location and 
gender. Now at a given point in time and hence with a given (and 
probably quite limited) range of "technologies", a firm or 
entrepreneur will wish to utilize various types of labor services 
incorporating certain skills. There will be some ability to 
substitute other types of services (at different wages), but as 
a first approximation production technology is a function of 
product design, while the inter-relatedness of most parts in an 
automobile makes even incremental design change costly.12 Given 
a relatively fixed technology, efficient production requires that 
one be able to employ labor appropriate to the task at hand. 
The heterogeneity of production processes and labor types 
implies there can be no expectation <3 priori that (efficiency-
adjusted) wages measured in a common unit of time will be equal; 
salaries can be expected to diverge substantially depending on 
the type of work(er). In the extreme, a certain "job" may intrin-
sically have a high marginal product but can be such that virtu-
ally any worker can carry it out; with competition, rents will 
accrue to the employer (or, with competition among employers, to 
the consumer). Because of the heterogeneity of labor (jobs), not 
every worker will be suited to every job; assignments will be 
made on the basis of observables. In the first instance, then, 
wages will be a function of age, gender, education, prior experi-
ence, verbal skills, and a few other items.13 At the initial 
stages of employment only a limited range of characteristics are 
observable; others will only be revealed over time. Even then, 
certain characteristics are hard to observe, matches difficult to 
make at the firm or plant level.14 
Given this model of wage determination, at entry into the 
labor force pay within a cohort of individuals comparable in 
terms of this list of characteristics should be roughly equal.15 
Until the tabula rasa of the new graduate (worker) is filled by 
experience, there may be little interpersonal difference in pro-
ductivity (pay) as well. In either case, the lowest common deno-
minator in the market at large dominates. With the passage of 
time, anticipated capacity is transformed into actual capabili-
ties, general and firm-specific human capital is accumulated, and 
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performance at the individual level can be evaluated with greater 
precision. Wages can be expected to diverge. 
Implications 
To summarize the above, a wide range of labor types with a 
correspondingly wide divergence in compensation are to be expec-
ted in the production of a good such as an automobile. If, 
however, a firm is constrained in the extreme to employ workers 
at a single wage (or, more realistic and somewhat less restric-
tive, on a single wage scale), then employing such heterogeneous 
inputs internal to the firm entails a pecuniary cost. Workers at 
a skill/compensation level greater than the norm of the firm 
cannot be hired, or, having accumulated skills, will exit. 
Workers at a lower skill/compensation level will gladly seek 
employment, since they will receive unwarrantedly high compensa-
tion, above what they would otherwise obtain in the market. 
If this is the case, then there is a clear incentive for 
firms to specialize in a core set of activities appropriate to 
the wage/skill level of the workers they have culled out of the 
labor market, and to seek to subcontract work to (or act as a 
subcontractor to) firms with labor from higher- and lower-wage 
segments of the market. Where "markets" for the relevant 
products exist, this presents no problems, but for a good such as 
an automobile, much of the production is highly model-specific, 
and so transactions cost considerations suggest that there will 
be limits on the ability to do so. Hence the "core" activities 
should be similar across firms, and be ones which can be 
identified as involving potentially serious contracting 
difficulties, while the periphery should vary in line with the 
pressure for homogeneity, e.g., for firms in different countries. 
(Elsewhere the author argues that there have also been 
innovations in managing subcontracting relationships in Japan 
which serve to lower transactions costs, and hence increase the 
extent of subcontracting.) 
In any event, the force of homogeneity pressures firms in 
Japan to avoid vertical integration, separate from incentive 
issues and diseconomies of scale in management technologies (as 
in the loss of control literature). Similar stories can be told 
in terms of distortions from the ideal in other factor markets; 
differential access to finance in capital markets, for example, 
can also affect the scope of the firm, on the margin. The 
development of those examples will be left to another paper. The 
author believes, however, that at least in Japan, labor market 
aspects are the most important. 
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III. Heterogeneity and Homogeneity in Japanese Labor Markets 
Heterogeneity in Markets 
Haw great is the range o£ wages paid in the Japanese 
economy? The following demonstrates the wide variation found in 
manufacturing. Firm-level (case study) and aggregate data are 
then used in the next two subsections to argue that the labor 
force within firms is homogeneous relative to this diversity. 
Section IV will then detail the apparent strength and possible 
sources of these constraints in using varied types of labor 
within a single firm,16 while the US case will be examined 
briefly in Section V. 
The lowest wage in the Japanese labor market is that paid to 
part-time female labor by housewives ("paato") returning to the 
labor market after marriage and their initial child-rearing 
years. As is detailed later, a representative labor cost for 
this important segment of the labor market is ¥600 per hour, with 
a 35-hour workweek; almost the entirety of this is comprised of 
the wage, as benefits are minimal. One can readily find manufac-
turing establishments in Japan almost entirely staffed by such 
female blue-collar workers, including in the automotive industry. 
At the opposite extreme are the top managers of large corpora-
tions. Salary and bonuses for the directors (the top 30 to 40 
managers) of the four largest automotive firms averaged ¥18 
million a year in 1978, though benefits presumably increased this 
substantially; this was about the same level as at the smaller 
Nissan Diesel in 1983, a not very good year for the firm. It is 
probably inappropriate to convert this to an hourly rate, but 
assuming a 3,000-hour work-year would leave them on average with 
a direct compensation ten times that of paato, but not highly 
paid by the standards of American top management.17 
That pay varies substantially should not be surprising; 
tables that follow will detail wages for paato and for male high-
school graduates. First, though, the average hourly labor cost 
for one of the less-successful automotive firms is developed as 
an estimate of how costs contrast with wages. Accepting the 
common Japanese presumption that success is reflected in wages, 
this serves as a lower bound. This full-time, male, large-firm 
(and primarily blue-collar) compensation also contrasts sharply 
with that of female part-time labor. 
Table 4-1 provides a labor cost estimate for Nissan Diesel, 
the smallest Japanese automotive firm in terms of employment. 
Nissan Diesel is an engine and truck-manufacturing subsidiary of 
Nissan that until the late 1940fs had been the independent 
Minsei Sangyo.1* It employed 6,970 workers as of June 1983; 
another 841 "employees" were shuJcko (on loan) to other firms. 
The average employee was 31 years old with a monthly average base 
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pay (wages and overtime but not bonus) of ¥204,670. Adjusted for 
bonuses and benefits, however, monthly compensation comes to 
¥358,000 per month, 1.75 times this "regular" wage, and at ¥2200 
per hour is 3.5 times that of a paato. 
The 1984 Chinqin Kozo Kihon Tokei Chosa ("Wage Census") 
provides a statistical overview of paato hourly wages, broken 
down by age and firm size; this data is presented in Table 4-2. 
Similarly, Table 4-3 presents the wages of high-school graduates, 
based on the monthly wages reported in the Wage Census. These 
have been adjusted for bonuses and converted to an hourly wage 
using the data on bonuses and hours worked reported in the May 
1984 Rodo Tokei Chosa Geppo. If Nissan Diesel is taken as repre-
sentative of large firms, then labor costs for large firms will 
be 20% higher than the wage levels reported below; alternatively, 
total labor costs are 75% greater than pre-bonus "base pay". 
When "identical" workers (those in the same industry of 
idential sex, education, and age / tenure) are compared across 
firm size, those in smaller firms are uniformly found to receive 
lower compensation; this is true not only of Japan, but also of 
other developed economies as well as LDCs. One interpretation 
(and the author's view), is that this is largely due to 
Table 4-1 Per Employee Labor Costs, Nissan Diesel, FY 1983 
Item annual monthly hourly US$ 
1. Labor Cost of 
Production: ¥3474319 ¥289527 ¥1810 $12. .06 
2. Labor Cost of Sales: ¥581349 ¥48446 ¥303 $2. .02 
3. Retirement funding: ¥109755 ¥9146 ¥57 $0, .37 
4. Management pay: ¥28551 ¥2379 ¥15 $0. .10 
5. Management bonuses: ¥7174 ¥598 ¥4 $0. .02 
6. Mandated benefits: ¥49928 ¥4161 ¥26 $0. .17 
7. Other benefits: ¥21377 ¥1781 ¥11 $0. .07 
8. Loan subsidy: ¥16360 ¥1363 ¥9 $0. .06 
9. Deposit subsidy: ¥10712 ¥893 ¥6 $0. .04 
Total: ¥4299525 ¥358294 ¥2239 $14. .93 
Notes: Data are from annual financial statements. A month was 
estimated as 160 hours (large-firm automotive average w<as 
180 hours, including overtime, but Nissan Diesel was doing 
very poorly, so an 8-hour day was used.) Here ¥150 = US$1. 
Items 1 & 2 include bonus payments. The subsidies are 
estimated as 1% of the value of loans to and deposits by 
employees. Employment here (6970) does not reflect shukko, 
whose salaries are paid by the receiving firm.19 
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Table 4-2 Female paato wages, all industries (¥ per hour)20 
age average % increase large medium small 
• 83 '84 '83 '84 '83 f84 '83 '84 f83 f84 
30-34 550 554 2.2 0.7 576 578 562 559 531 541 
35-39 543 556 2.8 2.4 575 582 541 557 530 545 
40-44 552 567 3.4 2.7 587 596 551 562 536 557 
45-49 565 577 4.4 2.1 597 609 570 579 542 558 
50-54 572 586 5.7 2.4 612 636 582 582 545 569 
55-59 571 584 4.8 2.3 615 661 596 583 545 567 
all 560 572 3.7 2.1 590 601 565 575 542 557 
Source: Chingin Kozo Kihon Toke i Chosa, 1984. 
The "all" classification includes those younger than 
30 and older than 60. Paato in large firms may receive 
bonuses, so that the above may understate their 
compensation. 
Table 4-3 Hale High School Graduate Wages, manufacturing 
(¥ per hour) 
age large medium small 
'83 f84 f83 '84 '83 •84 
18-19 933 970 850 878 745 772 
20-24 1088 1112 984 1001 895 915 
25-29 1457 1502 1256 1279 1163 1191 
30-34 1780 1851 1605 1617 1466 1478 
35-39 2273 2300 2000 1987 1721 1737 
40-44 2678 2735 2289 2381 1983 1984 
45-49 3106 3186 2642 2781 2096 2205 
50-54 3195 3329 2766 2819 2048 2305 55-59 sample size too small to report 
Source: Chingin Kozo Kihon Tokei Chosa, 1984. 
Average monthly hours worked for males in manufacturing 
was 188 hours for firms with 30-99 workers, 182 hours 
for firms with 100-499 and 178 hours for firms with 
over 500 workers; these estimates are from a different 
sample base than the wage data. The bonus used was, 
respectively, 4.5 months, 4 months and 3 months. No 
correction was made for variation other benefits. 
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unmeasured character istics , rather union power or "dualistic" 
discrimination; in any event compensation typically varies by 20% 
to 50%, with some cyclical fluctuation.21 Note that this is not 
the case for paato; as Table 4-2 indicates, for them wages vary 
little with firm size. 
A method of measuring such differences frequently used in 
Japan is to compare the wages of "standardized11 workers by firm 
size, where standardized workers are male high school graduates 
employed in manufacturing who have been in the same firm since 
leaving school. In 1981, the wages of such workers in firms with 
10-99 employees were 90% or more of those of workers in firms 
with over 1,000 employees through age 44, and somewhat more than 
large firm wages during ages 22-29; they were at their lowest at 
retirement age (55-59) but were still 82% of large firm wages.22 
In 1971, while the economy was still growing rapidly, the pattern 
was similar in the middle years, but wages actually averaged 
higher in smaller firms for the first 10 or so years, and were 
substantially lower for older workers. In 1961, with the 
economy at the start of the "rapid growth" era, wages were 
uniformly lower in smaller firms, ranging from 92-96% for ages 
18-34, but falling to 80% or less thereafter.23 
A similar story is seen in Table 4-4, which compares male 
wages by firm size without correcting for age or tenure. For the 
first 10 years of employment (tenure), wages barely diverge; it 
is only after substantial experience has accrued that wages begin 
to diverge. These differences are not trivial, but they suggest 
again that different types of workers must be utilized in order 
to obtain a different wage mix. Futhermore, as the differences 
in average wages are far greater than those for similar (for 
example, "standard") workers, the conclusion is that small firms 
are able to do this, by varying their labor force to a greater 
extent than large firms do. 
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Table 4-4 Male wages by age and firm size (all education levels 
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18-19 94% 92% 93% 91% ¥122 98 97 ¥116 
20-24 95 96 93 95 140 99 100 142 
25-29 93 95 91 93 17 6 96 100 178 
30-34 92 92 91 91 209 93 97 231 
35-39 91 86 91 88 234 92 91 282 
40-44 89 80 90 85 251 90 83 336 
45-49 86 73 90 81 258 87 77 376 
50-54 84 69 86 77 263 87 73 392 
55-59 82 68 82 74 251 85 74 360 
all | 88 82 I 88 87 ¥216 I 89 86 ¥281 
Notes: A large firm here is one with 1,000 or more employees; a 
medium-sized firm is one with 100-999 employees, and a small 
firm is one with 10-99 employees. The source is Table 6, pg. 
20# Rodo Tokei Chosa Geppo 36:5 (May 1984) for indices, 
Table 4, p. 19 for wages. 
Homogeneity in Firms: Case Study Evidence 
Clearly a wide variety of types of workers at a substantial 
range of wages is available in the Japanese labor market. 
Empirically, however, this variety is not found within firms, but 
only between firms; there is specialization at the firm level in 
the type of worker employed. In order to "tap" a different type 
of labor, or a different regional labor market, firms turn to 
other firms via subcontracting. 
The following case studies of three firms illustrate the 
very focused nature of the internal labor force in Japan. Other 
indicative data from standard statistical sources are presented 
in the subsequent subsection, but it is only at the firm level, 
and hence through case studies, that this specialization is 
readily apparent. These cases reported below are drawn from a 
sample of 30 firms which were visited during the course of r the 
author's research in Japan. In part because of their Intrinsic 
interest, and in part because they will be referred to in other 
parts of the author's Ph.D. dissertation, the firms are described 
at some length. They are also representative, in that for any of 
them another firm could have been substituted which had similar 
labor practices. In the case of Kakaa Tenka, for example, the 
published literature offers other examples. 
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The following material is based on interviews conducted by 
the author in 1984. For Kachikachi Corp., four days were spent 
interviewing management and visiting parent and affiliated 
plants; this has been supplemented by a variety of published and 
unpublished materials.24 Kachikachi Corp is located in a city 
of 50,000 people several hours from Tokyo; it is a large manufac-
turing firm with a "permanently" employed labor force, white- and 
blue-collar, of 8,000. Kakaa Tenka is located near its parent 
firm, an affiliate of Kachikachi located in the same mountain 
district. Futsuka Yoi was visited once; in addition, other firms 
supplying the same parent firm, as well as the parent firm 
itself, were visited one or more times, and a firm history of the 
parent read. These firms were all located in the Yokohama area. 
Futsuka Yoi 
Futsuka Yoi Inc. is a supplier to a firm which in turn 
supplies truck bodies for a Tokyo-area truck factory; it is thus 
a second-tier subcontractor. This firm consists of the owner, 
one other skilled worker, and a dozen or so other workers. 
None of these workers are young, and most are downright 
unreliable, according to the owner. In fact, at the time, 
only 8 were present; one or two, the implication was, had 
drinking or health problems. There were three women working at 
a punch and two spot welders, where they were putting nuts on 
pieces of sheet metal that would go into a truck. None of the 
women appeared to be under 50; two men were distinctly elderly, 
appearing to be in their late 60's. 
The owner noted, however, that he survived because he was 
able to manage such a work force, which not surprisingly did not 
command very good wages. He was involved in making very small, 
intermittent production run stampings, for specialized truck 
bodies that were sold in low quantities or (presumably) as 
replacement parts. Most of his facilities, in fact, consisted of 
dies owned by the "parent" company, stored neatly on racks for 
maintenance and ready access. He had only three medium-sized 
presses, two smaller ones, and the spot welders and punches; 
not all of them were in use at the time, both because his work 
flow was irregular -- he purposely maintained excess capacity --
and because it was not a good year for truck sales. 
With his production neither regular nor high in volume, he 
did not need a regular labor force to staff a "line". He was 
also not out too much money if more people showed up thanr he 
needed on a given day. He could call those who had failed to 
show up, or one or two older workers who wanted only occasional 
work if he had a rush of orders. Since he worked only for one 
firm -- 100% of his business was for the larger truck body 
manufacturer -- he could work with them as their orders came in, 
to judge by what time his own items would be needed and thereby 
schedule the flow of his production. 
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It is hard to imagine such an operation in a larger firm; 
the manager of the department would have to have total discretion 
over hiring and firing, wages, scheduling -- in short, he would 
have to have authority to run it as if it was his own business, 
without need to adhere to company "policy". But if that were the 
case, there could be nothing gained by having it an "inside" 
operation, and it would be hard to gear incentives to have some-
one work as if it were theirs, without it actually being theirs. 
It would also be impossible to operate as anything but a small 
shop; labor management was intrinsically personal. The unit was 
that which could be comfortably managed (and, when need be, 
operated!) by one man. 
Kakaa Tenka 
Kakaa Tenka is located in a rural area, and operates as a 
subsidiary to a large precision equipment manufacturer. One of 
eleven similar companies, it assembles computer printers for the 
parent firm in an old school building. The most striking 
feature is that, outside of a handful of management and 
supervisory personnel, all the 200 workers are women. In fact, 
not only are they women, but all of them are married, and 
from the same village; the overwhelming majority are farmers' 
wives. Furthermore, they are all paato ("part-timers"), in 
that they work a 35 hour week consisting of five seven-hour 
weekdays, timed to mesh with the schedule of the local 
schools. All receive virtually the same wage, ¥600 per hour. The 
village social structure, in fact, made it very difficult for the 
company to do otherwise, and it had given up in an attempt to 
assign the better workers some authority; the ranking that 
resulted inevitably clashed with the social hierarchy of the 
village which governed their interactions during the remainder of 
the week. 
Because of the "short" (35-hour) work-week, these women 
were not classified as full-time workers, and the firm was not 
legally required to provide a number of otherwise mandatory 
benefits. Given its size in the local labor market, it neverthe-
less felt it necessary to provide some benefits in order to hold 
turnover to a low level. Kakaa Tenka thus offered some vacation 
and sick time and small semi-annual bonuses, and its pay is 
higher than that of similar (but smaller) operations in the 
region. (They get by with as little as ¥550 an hour, and 
no benefits.) With its rural location and work schedule, Kakaa 
Tenka found itself a monopsonist, tapping a particularistic 
labor market, but its position was not very secure. Not only 
was it aware of its impact on the local labor market; automobiles 
were rendering the village less remote, and good paato women 
were in demand in the region. There is a long tradition in 
Japan of structuring assembly operations to take advantage of 
such localized labor pools, and the village was situated in a 
region with ready access to both Nagoya and Tokyo / Yokohama. 
The parent firm, in fact, foresaw the need for further expan-
15 
sion, but was considering locating new facilities outside 
the region, despite a policy in the past of keeping all such 
operations near each other and the parent firm. Local labor was 
simply too expensive, relative to truly remote regions of Japan 
such as Tohoku (the Northeast provinces of Japan). 
Such practices are far from unique. Ono and Odaka [1979], 
p. 121, documents the use of 20 subsidiary firms by the Yazaki 
Group, whose main product is automotive wire harnesses. For the 
labor intensive process of manufacture and assembly of bundles of 
wires, shops were set up in heavily populated areas with house-
wives employed for 3-4 hour shifts, with three different time 
slots permitting staffing for the full day in truly part-time 
work. Yazaki also maintained employment rolls of over 1.5 times 
current labor needs, to permit ready staffing; apparently no 
serious attempt was made to promote long-term employment. As 
with Kakaa, all managers were full-time males affiliated with the 
parent firm. 
Yazaki also made heavy use of women in-house, but these 
women were hired after graduating from school and were not 
housewives. From 1973, however, Yazaki decided their employment 
had become "out of control" (for which one could undoubtedly read 
"too costly") and their numbers were cut back sharply through the 
simple expedient of not hiring more girls as the existing work-
force got married and quit. The details of management thus 
differed slightly from Kakaa Tenka, both with a simpler product 
and urban locales, but the motivation remained the same. 
Kachikachi Corp. 
Kachikachi Corp. is a watch manufacturer with 8,000 
employees, though it now has other products in which it does well 
in world markets. Its traditional product, purely mechanical, 
required precision manufacturing of the parts of the movement, 
assembly of the movement, and assembly of and insertion into the 
case. Twenty years ago, assembly was done solely by hand, but 
in the intervening two decades all of the steps have been 
automated, and most products moved to a production lines in which 
gears are inserted and near-invisible screws placed and torqued 
in by a series of similarly small machines. Only for certain 
low-volume movement sizes have lines not yet been built, and they 
are the only ones now assembled by hand; even "casing" has been 
largely automated. 
Electronic watches are far simpler, but mechanical ones are 
still produced in significant numbers -- a projected 15 million 
from one of the firm's factories for 1984 -- for developing 
country markets where batteries are not readily available. The 
manufacture of most of the components of movements, the 
assembly of movements and "casing" are all done in-house. 
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(Some movements were sold on an OEM basis to unnamed foreign 
firms, which did their own casing.) In contrast, the 
manufacture of the cases and facing is done almost entirely by 
outs ide suppliers. 
Other parts of the firm produce the quartz crystals and 
integrated circuits; wind the coils which are the other main 
element in electronic analog watches; and design and produce 
parts for electric shavers, floppy disk drives, printers and 
other computer products. (Assembly or other labor-intensive work 
on these products is generally subcontracted.) Despite this 
variety, the company has on the surface an extremely simple 
personnel system: there is only one pay scale, for white and 
blue collar alike, excluding the 80 managers of kacho or higher 
rank. Some people ascend further and more quickly than others, 
but in principle there is no tiering of workers; for example, 
title and compensation do not permit production and office 
workers to be distinguished. Most important, there is no 
leeway for the inclusion of a large group of "low-paid" 
employees for use in labor-intensive tasks. All outside of 
management are union members, and receive the union wage. 
A number of loopholes exist, but the personnel manager noted 
that the union had negotiated for and won limits on their size. 
For example, paato (female) or "temporary11 (male) workers were 
limited to 5% of union membership, with an informal agreement 
restricting them to unskilled jobs (such as material handlers) 
so they could not be turned into substitutes for regular 
employees. For many firms, employing women is a traditional 
way around rigid pay scales; most quit (or, depending on the 
firm, are fired) upon marriage or pregnancy. At Kachikachi, 
however, not only are women not fired, but very few of them 
quit. (This was not the case at an affiliate located 40 kilo-
meters away. The explanation they provided was that theirs was 
an old [silk] manufacturing and farming area where it was 
accepted that women should work in factories, and that in any 
case they should work, while in the neighboring castle town 
factory work was looked down upon, and women would leave when the 
opportunity presented itself.) While on average women at 
Kachikachi Corp might not move up in the hierarchy as much as 
men, the age component of the firm's wage scale meant that they 
soon were far from inexpensive. (I discreetly did not inquire 
on whether there were any women in management, meeting only men 
in my interviews; most of the people I noticed working on 
production were women, including many of those tending or 
repairing machines.) 
At Kachikachi, not surprisingly, very little purely labor-
intensive work remained. The only important labor-intensive 
item was the watch case, and there (despite much effort) auto-
mation was limited. Kachikachi purchases these watch cases, 
their only important outside purchase other than raw 
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materials. And being labor intensive and readily and 
cheaply transported and inspected, the drive in case manu-
facturing was for inexpensive labor -- overseas. In the previous 
several years, 20% of case manufacturing had shifted abroad, 
principally to Taiwan, where a local industry was developing. 
Soon the cases for all but the most expensive watches will be 
procured from abroad. (Initially these firms were begun by local 
entrepeneurs in response to the export from Japan of the 
circuitry and display for inexpensive liquid crystal display 
watches, for which they provided cheap cases; there was no 
mention of their having originated as joint ventures. Kachikachi 
did not apparently manufacture these components -- they probably 
were supplied by calculator manufacturers, a business line which 
Kachikachi had unsuccessfully attempted to enter.) 
At Kachikachi, then, the product has come to reflect the 
labor force: design, precision component manufacturing, and 
largely automated assembly tended by experienced women. It has 
proven easier to contract out, to purchase services and compo-
nents which require other types of labor, than to try to adapt 
the personnel and management system to cope with human diversity. 
Firms such as Futsuka Yoi and Kakaa Tenka exist to meet such 
needs, offering the management of their own, particularistic, 
labor forces. 
Homogeneity: Statistical Evidence 
Evidence has now been provided of the wide range in wages 
faced available to employers in Japan. Here age-specific wages 
by firm size and average wages by firm size will be analyzed as 
another source of evidence of specialization at the firm level 
(homogeneity within the firm) in the utilization of labor. It was 
noted that larger firms pay more than smaller firms for "similar" 
workers. This suggests that large firms are either constrained to 
pay more, or systematically hire (specialize) in workers whom the 
market evaluates as deserving a higher wage, using informa-
tion to screen employees in addition to that reflected in the 
standard statistical sources.23 Second, and more important for 
the argument herein, the difference is even greater when average 
labor costs in smaller and larger firms are compared. In other 
words, not only do smaller firms pay less for workers of the same 
sex, age, educational level and tenure (the crude "observables 
of labor force surveys, which nevertheless explain much of the 
variation in earnings),26 but they also systematically use typeo 
of labor not utilized by larger firms, such as part-time 
female labor. Furthermore, the case study evidence suggests that 
small firms as well as large firms specialize in ^ " ^ . ^ ^ 
of labor; the difference is in the portion of the labor market m 
which they specialize. 
For example, 1981 average compensation in manufacturing £or 
firms with 20-99 employees was 63.3% of that in firms with 300 o. 
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more employees, and 57.9% that of firms with 1,000 or more 
employees. Similarly, for incorporated firms, labor costs in 
those with a capitalization of ¥10-50 million is 58.2% that of 
firms with a capitalization of ¥1 billion or more. On the other 
hand, labor costs comprise 78% of value added in smaller firms, 
as opposed to 60% in large firms.27 
In more detail, drawing from the Japanese Census of 
Manufacturers (Kogyo Tokei Hyo), in 1981 total annual wages in 
manufacturing ranged from ¥4.06 million28 for workers in firms 
with 1,000 or more employees, to 2.78 million (74.7%) in firms 
with 100-299 workers, and ¥1.78 million (47.9%) for workers in 
firms with less than 10 employees. Similarly, labor force 
statistics for 1981 show wages in manufacturing firms with 500 
or more employees at ¥3.33 million, in firms with 100-499 
employees at ¥2.61 million (80.0%) and in firms with 5-29 
employees at ¥1.87 million (56.3%).29 The key observation here 
is that this variation in average wages is greater than that by 
firm size for (statistically) comparable workers. The compo-
sition of small and large firm employees systematically differs. 
Thus, for example, smaller firms employ more women. In firms 
with 500 or more employees, women comprise on average 22% of 
employees, and the proportion has declined over the last 10 
years. Women, on the other hand, comprise a little over 35% of 
the workers in firms with 100-499 employees, and 40% in firms 
with fewer than 100 employees.30 Similarly, the average age of 
workers in firms with 1,000 or more employees was 36.9 years in 
1981, while that in firms with 10-99 employees was 40.7 years; 
while this would suggest higher costs, other things being equal, 
virtually all post-retirement-age workers are in smaller firms, 
at wages substantially below those a few years their juniors.31 
Finally, and this is reflected in the average level of education 
of workers, smaller firms have on average more production and 
fewer technical and white-collar workers; in firms with 10-99 
employees, 71.2% are production workers, while only 54.1% are in 
firms with 1,000 or more employees.32 
This differential in wages with firm size is found in the 
automotive industry as well. The Japanese Census of Manufactures 
presents data on employment and total wages by firm size, from 
which average wages by firm size can be calculated. In the 
Census, the automotive industry is represented by four classifi-
cations, the automotive industry (at the 3-digit level) and 
automotive assembly, truck and special-purpose vehicle bodies 
(shatai kogyo) and automotive parts at the 4-digit level. Table 
4-5 presents comprehensive data for 1983, while Table 4-6 
presents comparative data for selected years. Independently, 
Odaka [1984] also reports that for the transport equipment 
manufacturing industry (a broader classification) the wages of 
workers in firms with 1,000+ employees, relative to those in 
firms with 10-99 employees, declined steadily from 170% of 
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smaller firm wages in 1957 to 130% in 19G7, before increasing 
gradually to 140% in 1976 (Figure 4-1).33 
Much as in industry as a whole, average wages vary by a 
factor of two, far more than the variation in wages for similar 
individuals (such as the "standard" workers) discussed above; the 
ability to use a different mix of workers surpasses the effect of 
"dualistic" wages. Given the greater share of labor costs in 
parts manufacturers, this differential is particularly important. 
Unfortunately the Census does not provide data on the sex or 
age distribution of employees, but the case study data based on 
on-site interviews again indicates that, as this data suggests, 
the type of employees in smaller firms is systematically 
different from that in the automotive firms proper and their 
larger suppliers. Further details are presented by the author in 
his dissertation, utilizing a variety of ad_ hoc Japanese-language 
studies of the automotive parts industry and other case study 
data. Below the sources of homogeneity will be examined, which 
will provide further examples of and some qualification on the 
extent of this homogeneity. 
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Section IV. Sources of Homogeneity 
Introduction 
Granted that firms in Japan employ homogeneous labor, one 
still needs to ask why should one have this firm-level speciali-
zation in the types of labor which are utilized, coupled with 
subcontracting? Why not have a tiering of workers, paid as 
deemed appropriate by the market, given their observable charac-
teristics, yet grouped within the same enterprise?34 Indeed, 
such practices could to a certain extent be observed in Japan 
during the late I950fs and early 196Qfs. 
The task of this section, then, is first to develop a set of 
reasons why homogeneity is a constraint, rather than a choice 
from several feasible compensation / labor relations patterns. 
Of these, the development and characteristics of Japanese labor 
relations will be examined in the greatest detail. Second, in the 
process of doing this, further evidence for homogeneity will be 
given, as well as details and qualifications on the strength of 
the constraints in using varied types of labor within a single 
firm, and how they have evolved over time. The section will be 
summarized by again returning to the issue of subcontracting, 
whether "the" labor relations framework was a significant causal 
factor in the relatively heavy use of subcontractors. 
A list of factors leading to relative homogeneity can be 
readily drawn up. First, there is ideology and social norms 
affecting what are considered appropriate social distinctions. 
This can involve, for example, the relative weight given to 
"egalitarian" ideals. These facets will be amplified briefly in 
what follows. Second, and the element examined in the greatest 
detail below, is "the" Japanese employment system, a pattern for 
systematizing labor relations that is widely accepted as norma-
tive and positive by both employers and employees. This system 
will be detailed, and its evolution over time and the leeway 
provided for individual firms to mold it to permit the tapping of 
disparate parts of the labor pool discussed. 
Underlying the above, but not directly addressed herein, are 
that a group of relatively similar workers may be easier to 
manage, both for the "bureaucracy" of a large firm and for the 
entrepeneur in a small subcontractor. One set of work rules, one 
set of wages can be utilized; cross-worker and longitudinal 
("panel data") comparisons and hence information on individual 
effort and work quality are easier to compile and more meaningful 
than when workers are more variegated. Social conflicts and other 
barriers to smooth operations can be overcome more easily. On 
the other hand, jointness in production, the presence of "teams" 
and difficulties in monitoring behavior mean that it is difficult 
in many cases to make pay disctinctions among workers on the 
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basis of their "contribution" in a way which will viewed as fair. 
Furthermore, assignment to "important" or "productive" jobs may 
be viewed as more the outcome of a lottery than a recognition of 
superior ability -- and even where ability is slightly better, 
there may be hard feelings if that leads to much higher pay, 
Rather than making arbitrary disctinctions, it is better to pay 
the same wage for the same type of worker. (In the US, the focus 
is on equal pay for equivalent "jobs" rather than "persons", 
though in practice the two criteria may not differ much.) 
Sociology and Ideology 
Ideals and social norms in Japan contribute to an emphasis 
on homogeneity within the workplace. There is a large sociology 
literature on the group orientation of Japanese society and on 
"vertical" relationships. While the author is not current with 
this literature, older works such as Nakane [1970], Vogel [1971], 
Cole [1971, 1979] and Rohlen [1974] detail both the concern with 
keeping a group harmonious, and with distinctions other than 
income relating to status. Equally important, a prerequisite for 
maintaining group cohesiveness is that members be similar in age, 
firm membership and other personal characteristics. When a firm 
desires to give an individual superior status as a manager, or to 
otherwise provide an incentive or reward for performance, it is 
possible (and necessary) to do this through more than compensa-
tion alone, and it may even be feasible to do this without making 
distinctions in compensation. The other side of the coin is that 
a relatively small differential in compensation can be viewed as 
setting someone apart and hence destroy their status as a "peer". 
(In contrast, compensation may be viewed as a better and more 
appropriate signal in the U.S.; a boss must be paid a substantial 
differential to be viewed as a boss, or a large difference in 
compensation must be offered as part of a package of incentives 
for them to be effective or credible.).35 
Firms are also embedded in local society, an important 
aspect when location is rural. This was one point stressed by 
the management of Kakaa Tenka, reported above. Where "peer" and 
"superior" are determined by factors external to the firm or to 
an individual's skill and effort, as was the case there, then the 
only feasible policy can be to make no distinctions among indivi-
duals in the workplace. Finally, there are attitudes that an 
egalitarian ideal should be given substantial weight, at least in 
post-World War II Japan. Furthermore, this is likely to be 
reflected in industrial relations. To conclude this subsection, 
the case of Kachikachi Corp. will be further detailed, and will 
be followed by quotes presenting a management perspective on 
egalitarianism. 
At Kachikachi Corp, the head of personnel could claim that 
all regular employees in his firm were on a single pay scale. 
The exception he noted was the 80 employees in upper-middle and 
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higher management. When pressed, however, he noted two further 
exceptions. One of these was temporary workers, who through 
agreement with the union were restricted to 5% of total regular 
employees (or, equivalently, union membership) and to jobs with-
out a skill component, such as material handlers. As would be 
the case with p&ato (which they may formally have been), such 
workers were paid far less than career-track employees. The other 
of exception was a small group of employees with specific, 
licensed skills, such as the boilermen who operated the heating 
plant; such workers again accounted for no more than 5% of 
all employees. They were paid according to the level appropriate 
to their craft, which in some cases was considerably more than 
a career-track worker of comparable age would receive. Note that 
on paper there was no differentiation among employees in blue-
and white-collar jobs. A college graduate enters four years 
older than high-school (generally "blue-collar11) workers, but 
given an age component to wages, they receive the same compensa-
tion as equal-aged high-school graduates. Parity is maintained 
for roughly 10 years, nor do bonuses vary by more than two 
per cent among a "cohort". Large differentials in compensation do 
not appear until nearly 20 years have passed, or at age 40 -- the 
age when promotions into middle management commence. 
In short, at this manufacturer, management has agreed to a 
relatively undifferentiated wage structure. In turn, the firm 
carries out only a certain range of operations, subcontracting 
specific, labor-intensive processes to other firms which 
specialize in lower-wage labor -- including, recently, firms in 
Taiwan and other parts of Southeast Asia. The "parent" firm here 
carries out design work, manufactures the tooling for movements, 
makes most of the movement, and carries out final assembly; it 
purchases the case, facing and hands. 
Compared to the US, this is a highly egalitarian system, and 
is viewed as such by Japanese as well. Ryushi Iwata [1982], in a 
book aimed at Japanese managers, discusses these employment prac-
tices as a "system", which has spread to the point that it is 
very difficult to change, or, at the individual firm level, go 
against.36 He devotes an entire section of his book to the 
"Egalitarian Mentality", and while he notes that "it is 
still not clear as to exactly how this egalitarianism came 
to strike roots in Japanese organizations" (p. 60), it is now 
firmly established. Hence, 
In many Japanese companies, during the first ten 
years or so of one's career with the company, individual 
wage differentials (between those members with the same 
number of career years) are seldom introduced even if 
performance evaluations are conducted. In the years 
that follow, slight differentials are introduced but 
they are, in fact, very minimal. Moreover, since a 
variety of allowances and fringe benefits are added to 
one's salary (depending on family structure and type of 
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work), It is very difficult to tell who is evaluated 
higher unless you find a way to compare only the basic 
pay. So, when you reach a managerial post, especially 
the level of section manager (which, in a typical Japa-
nese company, can take about 20 years), you finally 
begin to recognize slight individual differences in the 
number of years it took to reach the same level or in 
the prestige of the title that is granted. Only then do 
you get even a vague idea of where you are in the promo-
tion race. Very slight differentials that would func-
tion as an incentive in American and European organiza-
tions play a crucial role in Japanese companies. 
That is because even the slightest gap eventually 
ends up being significant, even decisive, in Japanese 
companies where a permanent relationship is one of the 
essential factors. In addition, the unique concepts of 
egalitarianism, capabilities and status awareness that 
make the Japanese highly sensitive about their status 
within the organization help these slight differentials 
to function even more effectively as incentives. 
Because of this, the Japanese system of age-grade pay, 
which at one time was criticized as being a disincentive 
for workers, has actually been arousing very keen compe-
tition for promotion in Japanese organizations. And, 
because the differentials are so small, more members 
stay in the race for longer periods of time, thus help-
ing the organization to maintain its dynamism. It also 
offers an economical, low-cost system for Japanese-style 
management .37 
Similarly, a journalist commenting on Honda Motors states 
In a maternal society like Japan, most people are 
strongly group-oriented, and tend to believe that every-
one within a given group must be equal. These factors 
caused labor unions to resent the evaluation of indivi-
dual members. And management also had to respect such 
sentiments on the part of the unions, for they were 
seeking to make this egalItarianism the basis for good 
labor-management relations, by avoiding large wage dis-
parities among the employees 38 
Many other quotes and anecdotes could be given to indicate that 
this is widely viewed as a constraint. The above attitudes and 
union pressures are items which contemporary managers must take 
into account, and which encourage the selection of a homogeneous 
subgroup of workers from the labor pool of the economy. To 
reiterate, these serve as pressures upon firms to specialize in 
specific types of labor, with the stricture truer for large 
than for small firms.39 In turn, subcontracting provides a way 
to get around this constraint. 
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ffLi f et ime" Employment and Homogene ity 
The Argument and the Stereotype 
While the above is symptomatic that management views the 
current pattern of labor relations as imposing constraints on 
their decisions, rhetoric and reality seldom are identical. How 
accurate is the stereotype of Japanese labor relations? To the 
extent that it is more myth than reality, then the argument that 
"the" employment system imposes a constraint on firms will not be 
supported. (And to the extent that "the" employment system is 
significant in driving firms to subcontract on the margin, then, 
ceteris paribus, the chronology of its development should coin-
cide roughly with increasing use of subcontracting. This test 
will not be performed here.) 
The following therefore analyzes the large firm labor rela-
tions system, asking whether it really is rigid, and how impor-
tant "temporary" employees and others exempted from the system 
have been in large firm employment. To do this, the standard 
stereotype of the labor relations system is set up as a model, 
and an overview is presented of when this "stereotypical" system 
came into existence and how it has changed over time. The analy-
sis focuses on the automotive industry, asking when the system 
developed, how strictly the labor relations system depicted in 
the stereotype applies in the industry, and how important the 
caveats are (that is, have automotive firms have been free to 
utilize women and "temporary" workers). Unfortunately the author 
does not know of any similar data permitting an examination of 
the evolution of labor relations in smaller firms. 
Briefly, the stereotype of Japanese labor relations is one 
of (1) lifetime employment, (2) compensation based primarily upon 
seniority and secondarily upon (seniority-correlated) status, 
rather than upon the current "job" and (3) hiring only of new 
graduates. Lifetime employment means that, once hired, a regular 
worker will not be fired or laid off until retirement (long at 
age 55, but currently shifting toward age 60). Seniority wages 
mean that similarly aged workers will be paid similar wages, 
rather than the wage being a function of the current "job". 
Hiring only new graduates implies that interfirm mobility is 
limited, so that the internal wage ladder is specified more by 
the firm than taken from the market. Finally, the qualification 
is appended that this applies primarily to regular employees of 
large firms and the government.40 
While formally applying only to the 1/4 of the labor force 
which falls under the above classifications, the author's obser-
vation is that many smaller firms view these practices as norma-
tive, or hold them up as an ideal towards which they strive, but 
which they unfortunately cannot attain. Kakaa Tenka, for exam-
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pie, explicitly aims at "lifetime" employment which, however, 
means they avoid new graduates who experience shows will soon 
leave for marriage and family; they experimented with but largely 
eliminated age and status pay differentials. Furthermore, while 
the system is commonly viewed as applying only to males, this is 
because women in general exit the labor force several years after 
leaving school, so that they effectively drop out of the system. 
In many firms women are offered the same options as men on paper; 
in few firms do they in fact continue to work after marriage, 
which is one unusual aspect of Kachikachi Corp, described above. 
The key point is that (large) firms are limited in making 
horizontal pay distinctions among workers of the same age, while 
the only inexpensive workers under a seniority-based compensation 
system are young workers and lifetime employment means that young 
workers (quits aside) inevitably become older workers, so that 
average wages are only low when a firm is growing (or recently 
grew) rapidly. To the extent that markets function well for 
labor, one implication is that different skills will be compen-
sated differently; absent an ability to make horizontal pay 
distinctions, the stereotypical firm will tend to specialize in 
one segment of the labor market or it will have a wage ladder 
which will tend to over-pay substantial numbers of workers, 
relative to the market evaluation. 
Development of the Stereotype Pattern 
The most detailed study of the evolution of labor relations 
is Gordon [1985]; he traces the development of industrial rela-
tions from the perspectives of both management and labor for 
heavy industry in the Tokyo - Yokohama - Kawasaki area, the 
region where several of the major automotive firms are located, 
from the 1800fs into the mid-195Q?s. A main theme of his book is 
that "the" Japanese employment system is not something that 
existed, except as one of several patterns, until the 1950fs; 
Odaka [1984] bears this out as well. Seniority wages, single 
port-of-entry, "lifetime11 employment -- these were only concepts, 
not practices, prior to that time.41 
Gordon observed that in manufacturing workers were initially 
organized on the basis of crafts, but in contrast to the Europe 
and the US, there had never been nation-wide organizations which 
could restrict craft entry in Japan (which should not surprising, 
given the pre-1868 [Tokugawa] political structure). In the early 
years of the metal-working industries, the typical skilled worker 
was a "traveler" who wandered among various large shops, often in 
different parts of the country, as well as periodically running 
his own small shop. If successful, he might even become an 
oyaJcata, a labor boss / foreman, organizing the workers for a 
large factory In a manner reminiscent of American "straw bosses" 
or inside contractors.42 
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As firms sought a more stable labor force (in line with a 
desire to keep the more expensive equipment they were installing 
effectively utilized), and as technology diverged further and 
more rapidly from the traditional craft base from which skilled 
workers had been drawn (and hence firms needed to train workers, 
often in the use of equipment not found elsewhere), firms tried 
to intervene directly in the management of their labor force.43 
However, wages were still those of the craft to which workers 
belonged (reflecting sk ill-cum-exper ience/age), and the bulk of 
workers continued to have experience at several firms, as well as 
in many cases running their own small shop for a while: they 
neither viewed employment as "lifetime", nor were firms success-
ful in keeping the labor force stable ~- even when they were 
given legal backing to do so during World War II (Cohen [1949]). 
White collar workers and "management" tended to be employed under 
a different system, which provided a model for postwar develop-
ments; Fruin [1978, 1983] provides case studies of such workers 
at KIkkoman, and the example of traditional merchants (e.g., 
Mitsui) is also often cited. They were not, however, representa-
tive of most workers.44 
As Gordon aptly summarizes, before the end of the 1950!s 
observers of Japanese labor practices would not have found the 
elements which today most Japanese and Westerners assume to 
represent "traditional" practice. It was only with the rapid 
spread of unions immediately after the war, which was encouraged 
by MacArthur, and the pressure through the rnid-195Qts (until 
1954 in the auto industry, for example45) of a militant labor 
movement that the prewar white-collar model began to be applied 
to the bulk of employees in large-scale enterprises. One 
feature of the militancy was also an emphasis on egalitarian 
ideals, such that there soon ceased to be separate white- and 
blue-collar unions in the same enterprise. 
Other features were a rejection by labor of output-linked 
compensation, and widespread demands for a "living wage" as the 
prime component of base pay* The immediate postwar hyper-
inflation and the use of payments based on family size and 
other such "livelihood" criteria during World War II (seized upon 
as a means to avoid wage controls) fueled these demands. The 
prototypical example here was the "Densan" wage pattern, 
reflecting the wage system adopted in the electric utilities in 
April 1947 as the settlement of a strike the previous winter. To 
calculate an appropriate "living wage", under the "Densan" 
pattern a cost-of-living table was drawn up, based on age, 
marital status and number of children; this in practice worked 
out to be a "seniority" wage. The "Densan" model was soon widely 
imitated, and continued to be influential at least into the 
1970fs. (Miyashita [1971], a handbook on setting up compensation 
schemes for small businesses shows how to calculate the wage 
needed to provide a "standard" living for a given age and family 
size, based on econometric estimates of the elasticity of 
expenditure by these criteria.) 
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The recessions following the end of the Korean War led to 
attempts by large firms to pare employment ("rationalize") led to 
bitter strikes, and immediately thereafter these firms resisted 
increasing the size of their unionized labor force; hiring 
patterns, "lifetime11 employment and the wage pattern were now all 
widely recognized, so that contemporary Japanese observers could 
speak of "the" Japanese employment system described by Abeggien 
in his 1958 book, The Japanese Factory. This legacy is 
important, because from the 1960fs virtually all firms with 300 
or more employees have had unions, whether formal or de, facto. 
By law firms are required to have a consultative mechanism, and 
academic observers of the labor market such as Profs. Koike and 
Shimada claim that these are active and important. (Where formal 
labor contracts exist, they stress consultation rather than 
impose detailed rules and contingencies.)4§ 
For the automotive industry, one sign of the development in 
the 1950's of unionized, internal labor markets can be found in 
the Chinqin Ji ttai Chosa (currently Chingin Kozo Kihon Tokei 
Chosa, or the Wage Census), which began in 1954 with a survey of 
over 2 million employees in different industries (out of a sample 
universe of G.5 million workers).47 Contrary to the homogeneous 
seniority-wage model, in the 1954 survey manufacturing wages are 
classified by detailed craft criteria. In the transport equipment 
industry, the breakdown is by over 42 different trades, giving 
age, tenure, wage, education, sex and other data. Not only are 
job classifications quite detailed, but in addition for several 
large classes (lathe operators, press operators, sheet metal 
workers and assemblers) data was not on tenure but on experience: 
the market was clearly viewed as an interfirm one, and one where 
many apparently chose to work in smaller shops without a substan-
tial difference in their wages. The organization of these surveys 
shifted thereafter quite rapidly, so that by 1964 there were 
fewer classifications, and of the 30 reported in the Wage Census, 
10 were now for management and only 20 were for trades -- and 
several of the latter were specifically subindustry classifica-
tions. By the 1974 survey, only three craft classes remained. 
Furthermore, by the 1970fs "the" permanent employment system was 
clearly held as the starting point for smaller firms in devising 
their own wage systems.4® 
To give an automotive example, Honda formalized its "basic 
system" in 1953, five years after its establishment. Along with 
(apparently) seniority elements, it also incorporated 52 job 
categories, a number similar to that used in the Wage Census, 
although Honda was at that time producing only motorbikes and 
motorcycles. The weight of these job categories is now small; by 
1974, when the source of the above was written, "job pay" 
accounted for less than 5% of base pay. What differentials 
existed were a function of a "ranking" (seniority-linked promo-
tion) system, where in principle there is no variation in pay for 
workers the first tier, and only +/- 3% until an employee is in 
his late 2Q,s.49 Similarly, Kato Shatai Kogyo, a truck body 
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manufacturer, moved away from a craft / apprentice system in 1953 
when workers formed a union and went on strike in one of its two 
plants, and it installed a "modern" employment system over the 
next decade.50 
In sum, prior to the 1950's the importance of internal labor 
markets was much smaller in Japanese firms, and wages are thus 
those of the external market. By the start of the 1950fs, with 
the rise of post-World War II unionism, this was shifting, and by 
the end of the 1950fs there was a clear perception of there being 
a "Japanese" system resembling the stereotype discussed above. 
Strictness of the Pattern 
Few if any firms ever had a compensation system based solely 
upon seniority. For example, the "Densan" wage settlement itself 
was soon modified due to difficulties in implementing it: too 
many workers had to be "grandfathered" and paid under older 
norms, resulting in an unwieldy and strife-ridden wage structure. 
(Younger and faster growing industries may have faced fewer 
problems.) Seniority continued to be stressed, and the institu-
tion of regular wage increases ultimately reinforced this. Never-
theless ranks (seniority-linked pay / promotion ratings) were 
again introduced in the early 1960fs, so that "ability" pay 
increased from an average initially of 21% of compensation in the 
mid~1950,s to 33% on average by 1962. In general, these changes 
became more important only in the late 1950fs and early 1960fs; 
for example, steel introduced a job classification system in 
1962.S1 Hence a mid-1960's a survey of employees1 views of the 
wage structure of firms found that only 9% of the large firms 
used the stereotypical nenko seniority system, although 49% used 
it as their single most important criterion. (On the other hand, 
9% based their compensation solely on job and ability and a 
further 33% used job and ability as their primary criteria, while 
also taking into account seniority.)52 
For the automotive industry, Honda initially had what seems 
to have been a market-oriented classification, as noted above, 
but it must be remembered that in 1953 Honda had only been in 
operation for five years, and was as yet but one of a host of 
motorcycle producers in Hamamatsu, the center for that industry. 
During 1960-65 Honda grew 9-fold, while production shifted from a 
reliance on skilled labor (which was in scarce supply) to the use 
of semi-automated machine tools and other less skill-intensive 
equipment; in this it was similar to the automotive industry as a 
whole. Job classification seems to have became relatively 
unimportant as a determinant of pay at Honda by this period; 
something resembling the "seniority" system was in operation. 
A major shift had however again occurred by 1970, as Honda 
began to place greater emphasis on ability and performance. The 
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new norm was formalized in 1972, with the setting of criteria and 
evaluation procedures which involved feedback to and from the 
employee involved (and lessened the influence of the immediate 
supervisor).33 Pay scales were also revised and publicized; 
ability was linked to promotions, and performance to bonuses and 
yearly pay increments. Noticeable in this are two shifts in the 
age-wage gradient. First of all, it had become flatter; in 1962, 
pay at retirement was 4.2 times that of a 20 year-old worker, 
"while by 1973 it had narrowed to 2.5 times that of a young 
worker. (See Figure 4-2, illustrating a similar narrowing for 
Daihatsu.) Second of all, in 1962 pay peaked at retirement, 
while by 1973 it peaked at age 40, a typical large-firm pattern. 
More important for my purposes, the compensation system included 
explicit bounds on deviations from the "model" wage for the 
average employee. For the first two ranks, promotion was 
virtually automatic, hinging solely on tenure, while the 
deviation by age 27 (as noted above) was +/- 3%; ability and 
performance were rewarded only later in one's career.54 Similar 
changes occurred at the other automotive firms, in studies 
described in the endnotes." 
In sum, the above suggests a gradual evolution in the 
details of practice (not all of which are detailed above), which 
include at present, relative to the stereotype, (1) explicit 
tracking (e.g., blue-collar vs. technical workers) and use of 
ability as an explicit component of compensation, (2) a ceiling 
on the seniority component of pay increases of age 40, rather 
than a continuation until retirement,s& and (3) a transition to 
an age-wage gradient which is far less steep than that of the 
1950's. Nevertheless, a firm's flexibility in compensation 
for the first two decades of employment for those who fall 
under this wage system is still very restricted; divergence 
among different workers only begins after a decade of tenure, 
and at a relatively high average age and hence already high pay 
level. 
Exceptions from the Large-firm Internal Wage System 
The above has presented an overview of the well-known 
rigidity of the wage system for the "regular" employees of large 
firms. To what extent can large firms exempt employees from 
this system, so that flexibility can be obtained (or, in this 
context, disparate parts of the labor force tapped without sub-
contracting) . Two avenues seem open to large firms to increase 
their flexibility, namely to utilize female employees who will 
quit before they become expensive, and to employ workers (such as 
paato and seasonal workers) who are outside of the union and 
"the" lifetime employment system. 
First of all, women are not, and have not been, a 
substantial part of the work force of large firms in the 
automotive industry.57 To give two examples, in 1962 less than 
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8% of Toyota's employees were female, and most of these were 
clerical; less than 3% of factory workers were women. Similarly, 
in 1965 Toyo Kogyo employed only 983 women, less than 6% of its 
employees, and only 82 women worked in factories.58 The same 
holds true now for the auto firms proper; women and paato are 
still a relatively small component of their labor force. (It is 
certainly not the case for parts suppliers, especially on 
average for the smaller firms.) 
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Second, and much more important numerically, were non-
regular employees, of whom the largest group consisted of 
zinjiko, literally "temporary" workers. (Some firms also had 
"semi-regular" employees, consisting of new school grads in their 
first (probationary) year, and "re-employed" workers, those 
who have reached mandatory (historically age 55) retirement but 
have been re-hired under one-year contract.) Part of those 
labeled seasonal workers were truly so, moving to automotive and 
other factories as a form of by-employment during the slack 
part of the agricultural season; Kamata [1982] supplies a vivid 
first-hand account of the life of such workers. Most however 
were full-time employees without either the security of tenure 
or the pay that accrued to "regular" employees. 
The standard (Marxist) interpretation of such workers is 
that they provided a buffer to protect the tenure of regular 
employees to recurrent economic crises; when orders declined they 
were fired. Another view, discussed below, held at that time 
was that such workers provided a way to circumvent the union wage 
structure and to weaken union power. It is important to note 
that "temporary" workers (and the same is true for women and 
paato, as the case studies above and those to be presented 
elsewhere in the dissertation suggest) are quite different in 
smaller firms: they are more likely to be long-term employees 
used as a buffer, or whom the firm deems as inappropriate 
to be made "regular" employees, with wages below that of 
equivalent "regular" employees. 
In the pre-war period various categories of non-regular 
employees were a typical feature of large manufacturing firms, 
but in the post-World War II economic collapse most such workers 
were dismissed, and hence were initially numerically 
unimportant. In the automotive industry they first reappeared 
at Isuzu in 1950, with the boom in orders during the Korean War, 
and comprised 11.7% of the labor force around 1952 at the (then) 
"big three" automotive firms (Isuzu, Nissan and Toyota). Union 
pressure reputedly resulted in a smaller number of such workers 
in the mid-1950's at Nissan (e.g., 7.3% in 1956) but the number 
increased to 44% of total employment in 1963, dropping sharply 
immediately thereafter; the same was true at Toyota, with 1961 
the peak. In 1967, such temporary workers constituted 9.3% of 
the work force, and while the proportion increased to 11% in the 
1972 expansion, it has fallen to 7% or less in the ISBO's.3^ 
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However, the drop in temporary employees at Nissan also 
coincided with the institution of a system in 1964 for 
"temporary" to become "regular" workers. Apparently a large 
proportion went on to do so, as such workers declined from 44% of 
the workforce in 1963 to under 10% in 1967.so The was a similar 
sharp reduction in temporary workers at Toyota. This suggests 
that in general for heavy industry before 1974 temporary workers 
either have gone on, through perhaps one or two stages, to become 
^regular" employees, or have left within a year, at either their 
own or their employer's instigation. This was a formal part of 
policy in some firms, and unions often pushed for rules regarding 
the transition of such employees to tenured status. The tremen-
dous increase of output and the consequent demand for employees 
from the late 1950s through into the late 1960s simply out-
stripped the ability of firms to increase employment solely 
through new school leavers. Middle-aged workers, unlike new 
grads, would start out as "temporary" workers; with the continua-
tion of the rapid growth of the early 1960!s, such workers were 
able to gain "regular" status. 
Women, then, have never been a significant part of the labor 
force in large firms, and hence have not provided a means of 
circumventing the wage system. Temporary workers of one or 
another category appear to have been important in the late 1950fs 
and early 1960fs; it is not clear how much flexibility this added 
in terms of wages. By 1965, temporary workers were in large part 
those in the process of becoming regular employees; while adding 
a transitory element which would lower average wages, they were 
soon to be integrated into the regular wage scale at higher 
levels, and even without this transition, the average compensa-
tion of temporary workers proper increased by 60% from 1959 to 
1963. While there was a 3:1 differential in the pay of temporary 
employees to regular employees in 1959, this had shrunk to 2:1 by 
1963 and as noted above the age-wage gradient was 4:1, so this 
would not seem out of line with what those joining the firm 
directly after school would receive.*1 While "temporary" workers 
were paid less than a worker with comparable experience, such 
status was not permanent, and conversion tables for Isuzu imply 
that outside experience and age were after this transitional 
period reflected in compensation.62 
Summary 
In sum, the permanent employment system itself has remained 
relatively inflexible since its development in the early 1950fs, 
while women have not been an important as a source of flexibil-
ity. Temporary workers were an important exception only to the 
extent that they were permanent "temporary" workers -- while 
confusing terminology, not an unknown employment status in Japan. 
This was however not the norm in large firms in the automotive 
industry. Temporary workers were an issue with unions from the 
start, and as at Kachikachi Corp their numbers are now normally 
kept to low levels. Interviews with union leaders indicate that 
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is some interfirm variation. While at Nissan such employees are 
less than 5% of the labor force, the figure is a much higher 10% 
at Honda, and all such workers are in the factories, so that 
(with 1/2 of all workers "blue-collar") roughly 20% of Honda's 
factory workers are "temporary".63 But this was again not the 
norm, and to the extent that there have been deviations, they 
were greatest in the early 1960s. As discussed elsewhere in the 
dissertation, by this time the subcontracting system was already 
in place. As one observer phrased it: 
Now from around this time [1955], in order to supple-
ment their work force, firms began to implement 
policies of systematically and strategically utilizing 




Here several issues are raised which, while important, are 
beyond the purview of this paper. The three principal ones are 
the role of entrepeneurs, potential gains from subcontracting 
other than a more efficient utilization of labor resources, and 
seeming parallels and differences between the US and Japan as 
they relate to subcontracting and labor utilization. The final 
paragraphs address the representativeness of the automotive 
industry, and other possible tests of the homogeneity hypothesis. 
The demand for subcontractors implied by this paper suggests 
an important role for entrepeneurs. On the one hand, entrepe-
neurial activity is needed to seek out and organize an appro-
priate supply of labor. On the one hand, entrepeneurs are needed 
to undertake process (or product) innovations which make it 
feasible to use a different type of labor force than that present 
in large firms. This latter process can occur as a result of 
ongoing R&D, both internal and external to the large firm. The 
former requires individuals willing and able to establish and 
operate subcontracting enterprises. In Japan there has been a 
large supply of such individuals; relative to the US, small-scale 
manufacturing is very prevalent (one of the observations which 
motivated this study), and those working or growing up in such 
small firms have been predominant in setting up new ventures. 
Data from Japan suggests that experience in small business is the 
best educator and motivator for future small businessmen; it is 
important in ultimate success.63 If this is true for the US as 
well, then the relative poverty in the US of individuals steeped 
in small-scale manufacturing enterprise may mean that, due to 
supply-side factors, it will be difficult for firms in the US to 
shift to a more intensive use of outside suppliers. 
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The author can attest to many in Japan who have done well 
for themselves as owner-managers of subcontractors. Their num-
bers appear large relative to those who have advanced into the 
higher pay of top management in the auto firms proper. (In addi-
tion to income, surveys of small business indicate independence 
is a also strong motive.) Nevertheless, if an entrepeneur must 
compete with numbers of equally clever entrepeneurs, rents from 
innovations and from the tapping of geographically isolated or 
other particularistic labor markets can be competed away, to 
accrue to the purchaser of the (final) good. But since the 
entrepeneur in the short run is likely to be able to earn rents 
from innovation, a powerful incentive is provided for technical 
change. Other parts of this dissertation examine mechanisms to 
encourage such innovation, not only internal to suppliers but 
also when it involves design changes or other coordination with 
the purchaser. An area for future research, then, is whether 
subcontracting serves to improve efficiency over time through 
innovation, as well as to improve static resource allocation as 
argued in above. 
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Next, do American labor markets differ from those in Japan 
In terms of homogeneity? Subcontracting is less prevalent in the 
US; if the analysis of Japanese labor markets is correct, as well 
as its implications for subcontracting, then a natural question 
is whether this is due to differences in labor markets. Have the 
differentials in compensation among those who are viewed as 
different in the labor market been smaller in the US, or have the 
internal labor markets of large firms been less rigid? Or are 
alternative explanations, such as a deleterious impact of the 
long-enduring oligopoly in the American automotive industry 
(aided by the UAWfs success in imposing uniform wages across 
firms) more important? 
At present in the US, the minimum wage is $3.35, so that 
an employer's cost may be $4 per hour, while UAW wages, 
including benefits, are over $20 per hour, five times greater. 
This would make one wonder at the extensive in-house manufactur-
ing of parts in Detroit, but two other elements intrude. In the 
US automotive industry there is the presence of an industrial 
union, which imposes very nearly identical wages upon firms, even 
though they may be in different parts of the country. 
Unionization also extends beyond the Big Three to include major 
suppliers, though not all are UAW shops; smaller firms in the 
US, however, are typically not unionized -- while virtually all 
firms in Japan with 300 or more employees have a union, as do 
many which are smaller. 
In any case, in neither the US nor in Japan have unions been 
willing to tolerate much tiering on a wide scale within 
(respectively) the industry or enterprise; the quote which 
concludes this paper reflects current American experince. In the 
US (as well as in Japan) the process of unionization led to a 
substantial simplification of job categories and pay scales, as 
"objective" criteria came to dominate subjective ones, and as 
salaries came to dominate performance (output) compensation.66 
Rigidity of internal labor markets may be a common feature among 
large firms everywhere, and preclude variation In labor costs. 
This would suggest that subcontracting is in general beneficial. 
It it is also conceivable that the range of wages In Japan 
is exceptional. This clearly calls for comparative study; as a 
start, Sterling [1984] suggests that Japanese and American labor 
markets are broadly similar. On the other hand, Table 4-7, 
following up on a suggestion made to the author by Prof. Banri 
Asanuma, indicates that the current high level of relative wages 
of the UAW is a comparatively recent phenomenon, beginning in the 
early 1970's. Since this data does not include benefits, which 
built up rapidly in the 1970's, it undoubtedly understates this 
trend. The greater US differential may thus be a product of the 
indexing of UAW wages during a decade of high inflation. If this 
is so, then the failure to subcontract may in the past have been 
less costly -- but is not the case now.67 
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Next, it is important to note that the Japanese auto indus-
try is not "representative" of all of Japanese manufacturing, 
though it is as a minimum important in its own right. Variations 
from the practices in other industries are more in subcontracting 
than in labor. Alternative practices are found in industries such 
as shipbuilding and construction, where orders are discontinuous. 
Here the large firm operates more as the general contractor, 
hiring in specialized contractors. Steel also uses "in-house" 
subcontractors, who work alongside regular steelworkers in the 
mills. Such inside subcontractors are far less prevalent in the 
auto industry, though they are found in truck body manufacture. 
Since this paper does not detail subcontracting ties, neither is 
it appropriate to detail interindustry differences in practices. 
But to give one example, in the automotive industry there is a 
greater durability and closeness of ties, in part due to longer 
production runs and (to date!) more stable demand.68 
FOOTNOTE: ref ASANUMA [1986] <== 
Finally, are there other tests of the importance of homoge-
neity for subcontracting? As noted above, most theories in the 
literature are arguments for the desirability of vertical 
integration, and hence are not relevant. Alternative explana-
tions, such as that subcontracting is strictly for incentive 
reasons, or to spread risk (with work pulled in-house during 
recessions) imply little or no systematic difference in the labor 
employed in parent firms and subcontractors. The risk argument, 
in fact, implies that they will be identical. The statistical 
data presented above indicate that this is not so, as do the case 
studies, but a test using firm-level data would be stronger. As 
far as the author knows, such data do not exist. Second, the 
author elsewhere presents a chronology of the development of 
subcontracting in the automotive industry; if this does not 
parallel (or lag) the evolution of labor market practices, then 
it will imply that homogeneity was not important historically, 
though managers view it as important now. Last, if labor is not 
important in the cost structure of the industry, then it will 
make suspect an emphasis on labor markets. For Nissan Diesel, 
direct labor is about 10% of total costs (profit is 1%). With 
labor intensive tasks being subcontracted, this would be more 
important. Again, firm-level data on labor inputs and labor 
costs would be needed to formalize the potential cost disadvan-
tage of vertical integration. (Ideally, data should be from the 
time that the decision to "buy" was made, since such decisions 
may be costly to reverse.) And again, the author knows of no 
such data set. But neither does he have any reason to believe 
that such a test would show labor cost differentials to be unim-
portant for total costs. 
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Section VI. Conclusions 
This paper has noted that manufacturing in Japan is in 
general less integrated vertically than in the U.S., and that 
there is corresponding a larger share of small firms in Japanese 
industry. It argues that one cause of this is the structure of 
internal labor markets, most obvious in the "lifetime employment" 
of the enterprise unionism of large firms, which exerts a strong 
force towards the employment of a homogeneous labor force. Given 
the inherent variety of inputs in the manufacture of products 
such as automobiles, firms are then encouraged to utilize outside 
suppliers as a more efficient source of disparate labor inputs. 
In support of this thesis, evidence of the homogeneity of the 
internal labor markets of firms, both large and small, was 
developed using case studies, standard statistical sources, and 
an examination of the structure of Japanese labor relations. 
In the real world many "markets" necessary for Walrasian 
Utopia either do not exist or are imperfect. Firms exist because 
the fill in or alleviate some of these lacunae. The theory of the 
firm, however, must move beyond the study of "generic" market 
failures -- e.g., monopoly -- to be of much interest. One 
development in this direction is the transactions cost approach, 
with its emphases on governance, asset specificity and asymmetric 
information as they relate to the feasibility and costs of 
"contracting". This paper argues that the structure of factor 
markets must also be analyzed, and in doing so develops a the 
theory of the firm which complements the transactions cost 
approach. 
This theory is developed in the context of a specific aspect 
of factor market organization, that of the homogeneity of the 
labor markets within Japanese firms. The purpose Is not however 
to analyze an "interesting" feature of labor markets; the essence 
of the theoretical point made herein is that such "non-economic" 
facets of market organization are central to an understanding of 
the firm. Again, while this paper is a focused study, the claim 
is that the approach is general. Other parts of the dissertation 
of which this paper is a part examine parallel arguments for 
other factor markets, such as those for capital and land. In it 
the development of subcontracting in the that of automotive parts 
suppliers Is traced, and It is argued that there have been Inno-
vations in management which have facilitated both the utilization 
of outside suppliers and more rapid cost reduction through 
product design and process engineering. 
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As a closing note, subcontracting is currently garnering 
more attention in American manufacturing; the efforts of Xerox in 
this regard have been well publicized.6* In the automotive 
industry, GM has announced that it plans to move 10% of its 
current parts production to outside suppliers by the end of 
1987.70 Firms are often explicit in noting that this is being 
done as a means to control labor costs; GM workers went out on 
strike in late March 1987 over subcontracting (among other 
issues).71 Finally, controlling labor costs is important 
because US firms are homogeneous as well; firms are constrained 
in the distinctions they can make in compensation: 
Two-tier wage s/stems falter 
as companies sense workers ? resentment. 
The percentage of new labor contracts with two-tier 
wage structures -- which pay workers hired after a 
certain date less than others with the same job 
declined last year for the first time since 1983, says 
the Conference Board, New York. From 1983 through 
1985, the share of two-tier systems in new contracts 
rose to 11% from 5%. But the proportion declined to 
10% last year. 
Once seen as an equitable way to control wages, two-
tier systems now are thought by many to be too damaging 
to morale. The International Association of Machinists 
says two-tier pay hasn*t bee an issue in its recent 
contract talks. The Food and Commercial Workers Union 
also sees its decline. 
A roman emperor 's use of a two-tier pay system for his 
army in 211 A.D. resulted in his assassination, accord-
ing to historian Edward Gibbon. 
-- Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1987, page 1. 
Italics / emphases from the original. 
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NOTES 
1. Williamson [1975] also presents models of loss-of-control, 
and using this and other organizational and incentive issues 
argues as well that there are limits on the scope of a firm. 
2. Data are from Nissan Jidosha Chosabu [1983]. 
3. Relatively few small establishments are part of larger firms, 
so that at the small end of the spectrum this is a good proxy for 
the more desirable measure of firm size. For more on small 
firms, see Patrick and Rohien [forthcoming]. 
4. WSJ July 10, 1987, p. 6, "Magna Industries Aims at the 
Big Picture". 
5. The article on Magna Industries cited above makes the same 
point; Magna has avoided unionization through a strategy of 
utilizing scattered, small factories. In its integration of 
skilled personnel (tool and die makers) it also parallels Japa-
nese auto suppliers. 
6. Joskow [1985] gives examples of contracting between coal mines 
and adjacent electric generating facilities; Corey [1978] gives 
an example of the independent "Green River Glass" placing a 
factory across the street from a Heinz ketchup bottling plant. 
7. The brake example will be analyzed in the overview of the 
automotive parts industry, as part of one chapter of my disserta-
tion. These joint ventures included those with foreign rivals of 
Bendix, which had three Japanese licensees in different segments; 
and joint ventures with these Japanese firms. 
8. See the case study of the Mizushima industrial park appearing 
in my dissertation. Interview data suggests that labor market 
considerations have been primary, tax / financial reasons 
distinctly secondary. 
9. Note that assembly in Japan Is subcontracted to other firms; 
Subaru (Fuji Juko) assembled vehicles for Nissan until 1987, 
while Daihatsu is one of several firms assembling Toyotas. This 
is no longer unique to Japan, as Chrysler arranged for AMC to 
assemble certain models prior to their merger proposal. See 
WSJ, 9/26/86, pg. 14. GM and other companies in the US import 
cars from affiliates for sale under their own label, but in 
general these have been designed and manufactured independently 
by these affiliates. 
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10. It has been a Japanese Marxist contention since the late 
1930's that the primary function of subcontracting is to exploit 
cheap labor. (A secondary function was to force risk on to 
subcontractors by pulling work in during slow periods). See, for 
example, Komiyama [1941] or the literature survey of Shinohara 
[1968]. In the English language literature, the most explicit 
statement I have located is quite literally in a footnote: 
An additional limitation, not discussed in the text, that 
integrated forms of organization may experience in relation 
to nonintegrated is that wage bargains may be insufficiently 
discriminating in the former -- especially in firms that 
have access to monopoly power. (An example is afforded by 
seat belt manufacture in the automobile industry. Despite 
small-numbers supply, with the attendant bargaining 
problems, as well as indications of supernormal profits 
among its suppliers, General Motors has not integrated 
backward into own-supply but rather contracts for these 
items. A principal reason for this refusal to integrate 
backward is that General Motors would be required to pay 
higher labor costs under its labor contract with the United 
Auto Workers than are its much smaller, independent outside 
suppliers.) Williamson [1975], p. 130, note 17 infra. 
11. Other institutional and market imperfection arguments can be 
found in the literature. The theory of teams and economies of 
scope are an example of the latter; economies of scale (market 
power) have already been mentioned. 
12. The value analysis literature shows that empirically it is 
not appropriate to assume that designs leaving an engineer's 
desk, or carried over from a previous model, will be optimal or 
even very good from a cost standpoint. See Miles [1972]. This 
suggests that incentives for incremental technical change are 
very important, an issue to be discussed elsewhere by the author. 
13. In Japan family enterprise and self-employment is 
substantial, on the order of 1/5 of the labor force. 
14. To state this formally, a cross-section regression model of 
individual wages against these characteristics will have a high 
R-squared, which the author believes is a reasonable description 
of the results of such empirical studies. 
15. Note that the author's observation is that Japanese 
firms have proportionately larger personnel departments than 
American firms, once payroll and other regulatory / accounting 
functions are excluded, while survey studies comparing Japanese 
and US firms show that the personnel functions are viewed as 
carrying more status in Japan. (Source is Marsh and Jtayinari 
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[1976]?) But as there is more decentralization and use of 
"postings" in US firms, more of the personnel function is 
performed outside of the personnel department, making such 
comparisons at best suggestive. -
16. In addition to the material below, there is a vast Japanese 
literature on dualism, largely Marxist in orientation, extending 
back over 50 years. While largely peripheral to the discussion 
herein, the author does not accept the view of this literature 
that wage differentials are a sign of "exploitation" rather than 
result of varying human abilities, ambitions and skill acquisi-
tion (unobservables) -- and sex discrimination. For reviews of 
this literature see Shinohara [1968] and Yokokura [forthcoming]. 
On dualism more generally, see Cain [1976]. On sex discrimination 
in Japan, see Smith [1987], 
17. Kyoikusha [1980], p. 136 gives comparative data on 9 of the 
Japanese automotive firms; it does not include Nissan Diesel, or 
Mitsubishi Motors (for which financial statements are not 
publicly available). Data on Nissan Diesel is from their 1983 
financial statement (Yuka Shoken Hokoku Sho). 
18. See Kodaira [1968], pp. 330f for an account of the spinning 
off of Minsei Diesel from Minsei Sangyo and its decline and 
subsequent absorption by Nissan. 
19. Land for employee housing is reported to comprise 8% of book 
value assets for Nissan. Such housing is a common benefit of 
large firms ~- see, for example, Kamata [1982]. A list of facili-
ties in its annual report shows Nissan Diesel is no exception. If 
a market rate of return is imputed to such non-productive assets, 
then benefits can be significantly higher. Note also that retire-
ment benefits are not fully funded, so that #8 underestimates 
this element of compensation, and probably by a very substantial 
margin, given the practices of many Japanese firms. 
20. This is from an all-industry summary of the Chingin Kozo 
Kihon Tokei Chosa (1984) (Basic Survey of Wage Structure) in the 
Ministry of Labor monthly, Rodo Jiho, June 1985, pg. 59, Table 
8. "Part-time" workers are defined as those whose work-day in 
hours or work-week in days are less than the standard set for 
regular employees. Note average wages are less than those in 
large firms, and tend to be less than those in medium sized firms 
as well, indicating that most paato work in small firms. Average 
"regular" female worker wages are substantially higher, averaging 
¥176,000 or about ¥978 per hour with a 180-hour work-month in 
large firms (ibid, p. 58, Figure 6); they will in addition be 
paid bonuses (of four months or more of their regular pay ==> 
effectively ¥1303 per hour) and receive more benefits. Paato are 
thus probably paid less than half on average of other female 
workers of the same age -- but comparatively few women in the 
older age brackets are "regular" workers; most leave the labor-
force at some point and must re-enter as paato. 
21. There is an extensive literature on this topic. For a 
survey on "dualism" see Shinohara [1966] and for an empirical 
study, Taira [1970]. For current work, see the various 
studies of Koike [1983a, 1983b, 1983c, 1981], Sterling [1984] 
and Wood [1984]. Younger workers are paid very similarly; most 
of the differential arises from age 30 on, when wages flatten 
out in smaller firms but continue rising until age 40 in larger 
firms. Finally, Odaka [1984] is a detailed, firm-level analysis 
of wages in manufacturing, although it deals primarily with the 
pre-Worid War II period. These numbers in specific come from 
Odaka [1984], p. 270, Figure 8-4. 
22. Table 7, pg. 20, Rodo Tokei Chosa Geppo 36:5 (May 1984), 
wages for male employees working at same firm since graduation 
from school, 1983. For high school graduates, pay during ages 
25-29 is exactly the same (¥177.3 thousand) as that of college 
graduates (both white collar jobs), and only 4.4% more than that 
for junior high school graduate production (blue collar) workers. 
For ages 30-34, high school grad wages (¥221.7 thousand) are 
93.8% and junior high school grad wages (¥204.3 thousand) are 
86.5% of those of college grads (¥236.3 thousand). 
23. Chusho Kigyo Hakusho, 1983, p. 141, Figure 1-2-8. 
Underlying source was Chingin Kozo and its predecessors. Note 
that in 1961 very few workers would have had 20 years or more 
tenure . 
24. The names of these firms have been suitably disguised. 
25. Common observations are that large firms hire from the top 
half of high-school graduates, and that they also invest more in 
on-the-job training. 
26. See Sterling [1984] for some econometric studies. 
27. Chusho Kigyo Cho, Chusho Kigyo Hakusho [1983], Appendix 
tables 11, 17 and 19. 
28. By this standard, the wages of Nissan Diesel appear to be 
lower than expected of a firm of its size. 
29. Chusho Kigyo Hakusho, 1983, Appendix table 34. 
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30
- Chusho Kigyo Hakusho/ 1983, p. 136, Figure 1-2-2. 
Underlying source, Sorifu, Rodo Ryoku Chosa, 
31. Ibid, p. 138, Figure 1-2-4, based on Chingin Kozo. 
32. Chusho Kigyo Hakusho, 1983, p. 139, Figure 1-2-5. Underlying 
source, Chingin Kozo. See also Patrick and Rohlen [forthcoming]. 
33. Odaka [1984], p. 261, Figure 8-1. This is based on an index 
correcting for sex, age and white versus blue collar, using 1970 
weights and a 7-year moving average; the data is for 1954-1979. 
Productivity (value added per employee) in larger firms ranged 
from 3.7 times that of smaller firms in 1960 to 2.3 times in 
1975. The data is for monthly wages, and thus does not include 
bonuses and benefits. This understates the differential because 
workers in small firms typically receive few benefits, while in 
large firms bonuses typically account for 25% or more of cash 
compensation and benefits add another 20% on top of this to 
firms f costs . 
34. As would be true for a labor-managed firm. Evans [1986] 
examines Japanese labor relations in terms of such models. 
35. Thanks to Hugh Patrick for this point. Concern with pay 
distinctions is not unique to Japan; pay scales are confidential 
at the university where the author works, and in point of fact 
pay is not discussed openly. All are aware that there are 
distinctions (economists, thankfully, are paid more than 
academics in the humanities), but an interest in collegiality 
prevails and no one wants in practice to bring it up. 
36. Page 13. Quoting at some length: 
Why is it, then, that a system which was basically 
designed and established by man to begin with cannot be 
easily reformed? This question is dealt with in detail 
in Chapter 7, but at this point I shall offer three 
explanations. First, it is conceivable that when a 
certain system has spread widely and struck roots in a 
society, the very fact that it has socially settled in 
would enable the system to display a strong constraining 
force. Second, each individual system, as a part of the 
overall system and together with the other systems, 
comprises an overall conglomerate unity. Therefore, it 
is easy to imagine that the reform of one system would 
generate various far-reaching implications for other 
areas within that institutional conglomerate. Thus, 
resistance comes from these other parts. Thirdly, some 
of the systems are bound to be intimately connected with 
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the unique psychological traits recognized among the 
people in the society. This tendency can be all the 
stronger in cases where there is a close connection 
with human affairs, in particular with matters related 
to personal status. Thus, an attempt at reforming a 
system sometimes encounters enormous psychological 
resistance from people. This sort of psychological 
resistance is different in nature from the perplexity 
accompanying relatively simple transfer of systems, 
which is basically a mixture of bewilderment and 
confusion brought about by the feeling of unfamiliarity. 
The psychological resistance we are talking about here 
can have a pervasive impact on the formation process of 
a system. 
37. Ibid., pg. 72. In his introduction, Iwata stresses that his 
models abstract from reality, but that the Japanese reader 
(manager) can readily add qualifications, and note divergences 
from the "pure" model. He cautions that foreign readers should 
realize that his models are deliberate exaggerations. In my own 
experience, a "fast-track" group is visible in large firms from 
very early on, and others do "opt out". There is even a term for 
such people, the madogi wa-zoku. (Government bureaucracy, with its 
rigid tracking, is infamous for this.) But within the fast-track 
group, care is taken to keep relative status obscure. In most 
manufacturing companies, high school graduates are off of the 
"fast-track" from the start, though not without their own career 
ladder. For more in the way of nuances, consult among others 
Rohlen [1974], Cole [1971, 1979] or Clark [1979]. 
38. Sakiya [1981], p. 177. 
39. See the quote from Iwata on labor relations as an economy-
wide system in endnote 32 above. 
40. Other basic references in English include chapters in 
Shirai (ed.) [1983], Fruin [1978], [1983], Sterling [1984], and 
Koike [1983c] (in Japanese see the last chapter of Koike [1981]). 
41. Taira [1970] had earlier argued that, contrary to being 
"traditional", the current system did not predate the early 
19208s, and was not widespread until the 1950fs. 
42. For the U.S., see Buttrick [1952] and Chandler [1964]. 
43. Capital per worker increased substantially in these firms; 
Gordon posits (p. 52f) that direct intervention improved capacity 
utilization, which had become an important consideration. 
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54. Gordon also notes the above changes. He states that the use 
of evaluations was implemented in many firms in the 1950s (Gordon 
[1985], p. 380), but that "job" was a rank or title rather than a 
wage criterion. He also notes (ibid., p. 385) the lessening of 
the age-wage gradient, interpreting it as a reflection of the 
political pressures of the young dominating union membership. 
55. Rodosha Chosa Kenkyu Kai [1983], p. 170 suggests faster 
divergence, e.g., some are promoted after the first 5 years. 
On Daihatsu, p. 106 notes that a group leader system was 
introduced in 1957 and a rank / ability system in 1962, 
replacing an incentive pay system, which in fact resulted in the 
same payment for all, pp. 109-110. In fact these brought about 
little change in actual promotion / compensation practices; only 
the later tie-up with Toyota led to change from around 1970. See 
other chapters in the book for a Marxist critique of the 
contemporary employment system in other automotive firms. 
Nihon Seisansei Honbu [1966, 1969] gives accounts of Isuzu, 
scattered through the text; Miyashita [1971], pp. 292-299 gives a 
systematic account. Isuzu adopted an ability pay system in place 
of a "Densan" system in 1959-1960. This was because the introduc-
tion of automation with the modernization around that time led to 
the hiring of a large number of relatively unskilled machine 
operatives, while the existing workforce had been primarily 
skilled workers / machinists; tracking was needed to provide 
these more skilled workers with a pay differential. For such new 
hires (when they were without experience) pay increases / promo-
tions were near-automatic for the first couple tiers, so that 
differentials did not arise until after many years in the firm. 
(For those hired with outside experience, there were conversion 
scales to locate them at a rung on the ladder reflecting relevant 
experience, education and age.) 
Yamamoto [1978, 1981], as noted earlier, is an analysis of 
Nissan, while Chuo Koron Keiei Mondai, 5:2 (Summer 1966), pp. 
209-216 discusses Toyo Kogyo, hinting that as the only automotive 
firm outside of a traditional industrial region it was not as 
typical as the other auto firms in its practices. Cole [1979] 
discusses Toyota Shatai and Nishiguchi [1986], Toyota. 
56. Note that promotions to foreman pay rank peak around age 40, 
so average compensation in large firms does not peak until later. 
57. This is not the case with all industries; electronics firms 
historically have employed large numbers of women. The 
automotive industry initially employed skilled workers, while 
women lacked the requisite experience, and often involved heavy 
work, shift work or extensive overtime, which under Japanese 
labor laws made employing women difficult, or which was viewed by 
both women and employers as undesirable work for women. 
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44. The bureaucracy and the military may have provided other 
models; the author knows of no discussion of these, although 
Gordon [1985], p. 48 does refer to railways in passing. 
45. See Cusumano [1985] for a description of the rise and defeat 
of the radical labor movement at Nissan. 
46. The views of Profs. Koike and Shimada are from private 
conversations, and from statements of the latter at the Japan 
Economic Seminar. Among others, see Gordon [1985], p. 345 on the 
nature of labor agreements. Koji Taira has also expressed 
similar views to the author, pointing out that the rules on 
employment of paatot for example, are almost certainly not in the 
collective bargaining agreements of these firms. 
47. Rodosho [1954]. The name of this survey varies with the 
date; see the Bibliography for citations. For convenience, the 
current appellation is used here. 
48. Mori [1978] gives a list of "model wage" surveys by 
prefectural and local employers' associations and governments 
which utilize as the main categories education, sex, aqe-cura-
tenure and white-versus blue-collar and industry. The large-
firm permanent employment system is held up as a model, albeit 
one which cannot be followed exactly: for smaller firms, more 
reference must be made to inter firm labor markets. 
49 Okamura [1974], pp. 283-5. 
50. Kato Shatai Kogyo [1971], pp. 171-8. The author has visited 
both Kato Shatai and several of its suppliers. 
51. Takagi and Fukami [19743, pp. 80-83. Gordon [1985], p. 353 
gives a varying decomposition. On the new postwar pattern, see 
ibid. pp. 337 - 360. Marsh and Mannari [1976] provide several 
excellent case studies, including one of steel. 
52. Suzuki [1969], p. 80 Table 35, apparently using a 1966 Minis-
try of Labor survey* Other surveys are cited by T. Ono [1980], 
53. For this see Okamura [1974], pp. 177-203; evaluation form 
are on pp. 185-198. The "model" wage and details of the
 P a 
system are on p. 278-85. The final chapter of Koike [1981] com-
pares the age-wage profiles of employees in large- and medium 
scale firms, showing a similar peak for workers in large firm^T 





° Koron Keiei Mondai, 2:2 (Summer 1963), p. 344; ibid., 
5:2 (Summer 1966), p. 209-216. 
59. Gordon [1985], pp. 401-407 discusses temporary workers, with 
data for Toshiba for 1958-1983. Such workers increased from 24% 
of the work force in 1958 to a peak of 33% in I960, but have 
comprised less than 10% of employees since 1964. They increased 
to 2% (5.8%) during the 1972(3) expansion from 1.4% in 1971, 
but fell to less than 1% in the subsequent recession, and in 
1983 were 2.5% of the work force. Nissan is discussed by Cusumano 
[1985]; the data here is from page 415, note 43. Toyota is 
discussed by Nishiguchi [1986] and by Allinson [1975], pp. 178-9. 
60. Yamamoto [1981], pp. 68-9 and pp. 60-62 detail this for 
Nissan; see the references in the above footnote as well. 
61. Ibid., p. 62 and Table 6, p. 60. 
62. Miyashita [1971], pp. 292-99. 
63. Interviews, Nissan and Honda union officials, Fall 1984. 
64. Nihon Seisansei Honbu [1969], p. 250. 
65. See Patrick and Rohlen [forthcoming] on family enterprise in 
Japan and the references therein, as well as Wood [1984]. 
66. See Chandler [1964] and Jacoby [1985], and the review of the 
latter in the Journal of Economic Literature, September 1986. 
Note also that the theory of efficient contracting in labor 
markets has now produced theories of internal labor markets with 
normative implications that appear to correspond well to reputed 
"Japanese" practice. For a brief discussion see Chapter 11 in 
Ehrenberg and Smith [1985]. 
67. Va11 Street Journal, January 27, 1987. 
68. See Asanuma [1986] for an English-language comparison of 
subcontracting in the Japanese auto and electronics industries. 
69. Along with media coverage, see Jacobson and Hillkirk [1986]. 
70. Wall Street Journal, January 27, 1987. 
71. Wall Street Journal, March 27, 1987. 
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Tab le 4 -5 
I 
Ctnsus of ftanufacturts Aute Industry Bata, 1983 
Auto (361), 1983 Esttb Eiploytts Avtragt Ifegts Hattriils Shipments Output Valut Addtd U/Eipl V/Eipl 
ttgular 
Eiploytts 
I lil 1 iillion 1 iillion 9 lil 1 iillion 1 iillion At 1 of 
10004 Ltvtl 
Total/Avtragt 10580 698690 612947 2601509 17401409 25450874 24685804 6610225 13723410 
i 
82.51 
4-9 tip I. 5275 31972 - 60787 81896 199717 - 117802 11901257 42.11 
10-19 tip!. 19B£ 27687 - 65472 143506 275514 - 123187 92363866 52,41 
20-29 tip!. 1111 27301 - 66373 184379 326878 - 132385 12431156 53.91 
30-49 tip! 645 25261 25059 67019 248586 393622 393786 133833 92653062 58.81 
50-99 tip] £89 47644 47595 131996 561237 847768 649475 259026 92770464 61.41 
100-199 tip! 384 52364 52179 161588 .. 756691 1077636 10B2470 289615 93085861 68,41 
200-299 tip! 151 36812 37226 122478 615411 865953 866622 216576 93327122 73.71 
300-499 tip! 125 47975 4836! 175345 840489 1221981 1223152 3209BS 93654824 81.01 
500-999 tipl 119 83525 83706 314447 1575480 2402770 2396786 710582 93764705 83.41 








17873513 4306169 94513760 100.01 
test (3611M983 II
I 
Production Valut Addtd V/Eipl V/Eipl 
ttgular 
Eiploytts 
1 ill 9 till ion 9 iillion 9 iillion 9 iillion As 1 of 
1000+ Ltvtl 
Total /Avtragt 47 191480 192946 892525 9328523 13642576 13662417 3399361 94661192 99.51 
30-49 tipl 1 I i x i X X X - -
50-99 tipl 2 i i i i X X X - -
100-199 tip! 1 I i i i X X X - -
300-499 tipl 3 1135 1185 4925 33451 41128 40428 6294 94339207 92.61 
500-999 tipl 5 3451 3815 13666 165295 246520 237592 64944 93743084 79.91 






672824 9124830 13346886 13367457 3325264 94684191 100.01 
•ody (3612)f1983 ttagts Hattriais Shipitnts Production Valut Addtd M/Eipl i/Eipl 
ttgular 
Etploytts 
I lil 1 iillion 1 iillion 9 iillion 9 iillion 
i 
As 1 of 
10004 Ltvtl 
Total/Avtragt 200 51005 49620 207812 1370723 1790187 1773921 378638 94074346 91.41 
4-9 ttpl. 1 i - X X X - X X X 
20-29 tipl. 59 1461 - 4484 12019 20440 - 8050 93069131 68,91 
30-49 tipl 42 1593 1599 4924 1104E 16466 18456 7077 93091023 69.41 
50-99 tipl 34 2365 2413 7592 20017 31329 31428 10865 93183229 7L41 
100-199 ttpl 24 t 3292 E I i 84809 X - -
200-299 tipl 10 2390 2394 8190 28984 44287 44437 14475 93719665 83.51 
300-499 tipl 7 2669 2715 10594 49730 73437 73151 21632 93969277 89.11 
500-999 ttpl 11 7933 8236 29956 165911 260344 - _ 258312 68647 93776125 84,71 
1000+ ttpl 12 29266 28970 130400 1026097 1259806 ' 1263328 201376 94455682- 100.01 
Parts(3£13)iiSi3 Est*b Eiploytts Avtragt Ikgts Hattfials Shipitnts Production Valut Addtd iagts/Eipl y/Eipi 
itgylar iiil 1 liliioii 1 iillion i iillion 9 iillion As 1 of 
Eiploytts 1000* Ltvtl 
Total/Avtrigt 10333 456205 370381 1501172 1702163 10018109 1249466 2632226 93290565 78.01 
i 
4-9 tipl. 5274 i - i i X - X - -
10-19 tipl. 1986 27697 - 65472 143506 275514 - 123167 92363866 36.01 
20-29 tipl. 1052 25840 - 61890 172361 306438 - 124334 92395124 56.71 
30-49 ttpl 102 i i K X i X X - -
50-99 tipl 153 i i I i X X X - -
100-199 tipl 359 48906 48726 150092 697000 991392 993393 261866 93068989 72.71 
200-299 tipl 141 34422 34832 113589 586426 821666 822185 202101 93299895 78.21 
300-499 tipl 115 %441U 44461 159827 757307 1107416 1109573 293063 93618370 85.71 
500-999 tipl 103 7S941 71655 270825 1244274 1895905 1900881 556931 93764543 88.21 
1000+ tipl 48 102529 10225S 432779 2242807 3232143 3233728 779528 94220628 100.02 
Table 4-6 
Auto Industry Fin Size / Avenge Wag* for Selected Years 
(Census of Ranufactures) H 
yages/Eipl yages/Eipl Kagts/Eip! Wages/Eapi Magts/Eipl 
Auto (361) 1959 1961 19H i m i m 
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Total/Average 















































































































































































¥313,599 ¥408,869 ¥543,414 ¥1,085,808 ¥4,220,628 











The ainiaua as ptrctnt of aasiaua: 
331 431 431 451 411 
Table 4-7 
Comparison of Automotive Waqes with 
Minimum Wage, U.S. 
Transport Trans Harm Trans Auto Auto Vage Hin Wage yagr Uag* All Auto Ytar 
Year ' Ml Factory l/hr $/hr h r s M l/hr Sifter Hag* Differ Differ Differ 
- Eipl Eipl trans iar.u/iiri trans/iin traris/aut o Factory 
1986 tanu ^sployttnt 
1965 
1984 1906 9.18 12.22 42.80 12.74 1.33 3.35 2.74 *3 kr-
wl. Qw 
1.04 — 1934 
1983 1747 8.83 11.62 43.30 12.14 1.32 3.35 2.64 3.47 1.04 — 1383 
1962 1744 8.50 11.12 1.31 3.35 2.54 3.32 — — 1982 
1981 1898 7.93 10.39 1.30 3.35 2.39 3.10 — — 1981 
1980 1875 7.27 9,32 1.26 3.10 2.35 3.01 — — I960 
1979 2077 6.70 8.53 1.27 2.90 2.31 2.94 .. — 1979 
1978 1992 6.17 7.91 1.26 2.65 2.32 2.96 — — 1978 
1977 1872 5.68 7.28 1.28 2.30 2.47 3.17 — — 1977 
1978 1733 5.19 6.54 1.26 2.30 2.26 2.84 — — 1976 
1975 1649 4.81 6.02 1.25 2.10 2.29 2.87 — — 1975 
1974 1821 4.41 5.48 1.24 2.00 2.21 2.74 — — 1974 
1973 1904 4.08 5.07 1.24 1.60 3.17 — .. 1973 
1972 1747 3.61 4.73 1.24 1.60 2.36 2.96 — — 1972 
1971 1724 3.56 4.41 1.24 1.60 2.23 2.76 — — 1971 
1970 1807 3.36 4.06 1.21 1.60 2.10 2.54 — — 1970 
1969 2061 3.19 3.6S 1.22 1.60 1.99 2.43 — — 1969 
1968 2028 3.01 3.69 1.23 1.60 1.68 2.31 — — 1968 
1967 194B 2.83 3.44 1.22 1.40 2.02 2.4b — — 1967 
1966 1912 1361.00 2.72 3.33 42.80 3.44 1.22 1.25 2.18 2.66 1.03 1.29 1966 
1965 1741 1241.00 2.61 3.21 44.20 3.34 1.23 1.25 2.09 2.57 1.04 1.28 1965 
1964 1745 1133.00 2.53 3.10 43.00 3.21 1.23 1.25 2.02 2.46 1.04 1.30 1964 
1963 1609 1113.00 2.46 3.01 42.80 3.10 1.22 1.15 2.14 2.62 1.03 1.06 1963 
1962 1542 1061.00 2.39 2.91 42.70 2.99 1.22 1.15 2.08 2.53 1.03 1.30 1962 
1961 1459 997.00 2.32 2.80 40.10 2.86 1.21 1.00 2.32 2.80 1.02 1.32 1961 
1960 1617 1133.00 2.26 2.74 41.00 2.81 1.21 1.00 2.26 2.74 1.03 1.28 I960 
1953 1670 1610.00 2.19 2.64 41.10 2.71 1.21 1.00 2.19 2.64 1.03 1.29 1959 
1958 1593 1124.00 2.13 2.53 39.20 2.55 1.19 1.00 2.13 2.53 1.01 1.31 1956 
1957 1878 1384.00 2.07 2.41 40.00 2.46 1.16 1.00 2.07 2.41 1.02 1.25 1957 
1956 1831 1358.00 1.98 2.31 40.30 2.35 1.17 1.00 1.98 2.31 1.02 1.25 1956 
1955 1832 1408.00 1.88 2.23 42.70 2.23 1.19 0.75 2.51 2.97 1.03 1.21 1955 
1954 1745 1335.00 1.81 2.14 40.60 2.20 1.16 0.75 2.41 2.85 1.03 1.24 1954 
1953 1953 1543.00 1.77 2.07 41.10 2.14 1.17 0.75 2.36 2.76 1.03 1.21 1953 
1952 1675 1321.00 1.67 1.97 40.50 2.05 1.18 0.75 2.23 2.63 1.04 1.23 1952 
1951 1510 1220.00 1.59 1.85 33.50 1.91 1.16 0.75 2.11" 2.47 1.03 1.19 1951-
1950 1273 1004.00 1.47 1.74 41.20 1.78 1.18 0.75 1.95 2.31 1.02 1.18"" 1950 
1949 1212 987.00 1.40 1.66 38.90 1.70 1.18 0.40 3.50 4.14 1.02 1.19 1949 
1948 i 1263 1031.00 1.35 1.5B 38.40 1.61 1.17 0.40 3.38 3.95 1.02 
1 ViiLUt. 
1.21 1948 
1947 1263 1038.00 1.24 1.45 39.00 1.47 1.17 0.40 3.09 3.62 1.02 1.20 1947 
1946 764 588.00 1.13 1.36 38.70 1.37 1.20 0.40 2.82 3.39 1.01 2.15 1946 
1945 0.99 1.26 36.50 1.23 1.27 0.30 3.29 4.19 0.98 IDiV/0! 1945 
1944 Average!.51 2.37 2.91 
2.26 2.81 
< Source : Monl thly Lab or Survey » various issues. 
Note that this data does not reflect benefits, which are 40% 
or more of UAW automotive industry compensation, and have 
increased in importance since the late 1960's. 
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Figure 4-1: Large Firm Wages / Small Firm Wages 
( A ) - f i * « » * K i l t » H a c h i n e r y ( g e n e r a l ) 
— : « 8 & f * ( l 9 7 0 # * * j f r ) . A d j u s t e d Valued 
—— : sfeBSfiit 7 A c t u a l Va lue 
(B) Ni%83ttt*$AX!&& T r a n s p o r t Equipment 
I960 1970 1980 
rce; Odaka (1984} f p. 178. Based on 7-year moving 
average. Adjusted value holds sex, age and blue vs 










Daihatsu Motors: Permissible Variation in 
Pay Rank Component of Compensation 
7-' 
Lowest P o s s i b l e Leve l 
CttfiElft) » 1 . 0 
IT 
1 2 3 4 5 * 7 8 
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Source; Rodosha Chosa Kenkyukai (1983), p.Ill 
